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Abstract
New efﬁcient algorithms for solving inﬁnite-duration two-person adversary games with the decision problem in NP∩ coNP, based
on linear programming (LP), LP-representations, combinatorial LP, linear complementarity problem (LCP), controlled LP are
surveyed.
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1. Introduction
Besides his ground-breaking contribution to the theory of linear programming, Leonid Khachiyan is also (but less)
known for inventing, jointly with Vladimir Gurvich and Alexander Karzanov [27], the ﬁrst nontrivial algorithm (and
constructive positional determinacy proof) for cyclic full-information inﬁnite-duration games on ﬁnite edge-weighted
graphs. In these games two adversary players, MAX and MIN, moving in turns, try to simultaneously maximize and
minimize, in the limit, the average weight of the edges traversed. These games, previously investigated and known as
mean payoff games (MPGs) [20,21], ergodic extensions of matrix games [44], and a non-stochastic version of non-
stopping stochastic games [49,26,30], present exactly the same challenge as linear programming did before 1979: they
are well characterized (Edmonds), with the decision problem (“can MAX secure a mean value > t when a play starts
in a given vertex?”) being in NP∩ coNP. Interestingly, the same is true for several quite famous related games. The
best known are Shapley’s [49] turn-based1 stochastic games, in which transitions are probabilistic and depend on the
choices of the players. Parity games, equivalent to the model checking problem for -calculus (ﬁxpoint modal logic
expressively subsuming virtually all propositional temporal logics of programs [22]) give another example tantalizing
the computer science community for about two decades.
Are these games related to linear programming, apart from being at the same pre-1979 stage? This paper sur-
veys several recent developments that make explicit the close relationships between cyclic games and linear pro-
gramming. Although the above-mentioned games are not yet known to be reducible to linear programming, it turns
out that many useful tools and algorithms from linear programming can be adapted and reused for such games
E-mail addresses: svorobyov@gmail.com, vorobyov@dbai.tuwien.ac.at.
1 The version in which players make simultaneous moves is not full-information and not solvable in pure positional strategies [49].
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(Sections 4,6, and 8), providing new algorithms, often more efﬁcient than previously known (e.g., subexponential;
cf., Section 8). A systematic attempt at putting games into the linear programming framework appears fruitful and leads
to interesting controlled generalizations of standard combinatorial optimization problems, including longest–shortest
paths (LSPs: Section 3) and controlled linear programming (Section 6). The latter provides a nice unifying formulation
subsuming (being “hard” for) a class of games in NP∩ coNP. Some well-known extensions of linear programming, like
linear complementarity problem (LCP) [16,45,17] also appear inspiring and productive for games (Sections 5 and 7),
and as a by-product yield new efﬁcient algorithms in P-matrix linear complementarity theory.
This paper2 is dedicated to thememory ofLeonid.Hewas the brightestmind I evermet. For himeverythingwas either
clearly impossible (because of nonconvexity, etc.) or trivial (including his own 1979 result). He knew surprisingly many
things and enlightened me on (it was enough to mention something) numerous exotic topics without any preparation,
repeatedly asserting (rather than asking) “you understand?”, which left me, if not embarrassed, with lots of homework
(I still have to do).We ﬁrst met in the summer of 1998 at theMax-Planck Institut für Informatik (Saarbrücken, Germany)
and since then tried to ﬁnd new approaches to mean payoff and parity games. In 2004 I ventured to explain to him the
(half-baked then) LSPs problem I was excited about at that time (Section 3), which eventually lead to a new algorithm
for MPGs [13]. Later Leonid told me he knew it all along (even suggested it to Richard Karp), and retaliated with
[55,37,36], which provides for a generalization concerning blocking, and gives a polynomial bound, but is restricted
to nonnegative edge weights only. This, unfortunately, is not enough to cover MPGs. When I suggested to generalize
LSPs to other controlled optimization problems, like controlled maximum ﬂow, Leonid ﬁrst was enthusiastic, until
we quickly realized that such problems were usually NP-hard. For that reason he did not believe in controlled linear
programming (Section 6), which ﬁnally and surprisingly turned out not NP-hard in several practically important cases.
There remain numerous promising ideas we tried (I still have to understand some), for which, unfortunately, we were
not given enough time to develop.
2. Preliminaries on cyclic games
2.1. Mean payoff games
An MPG is played on a ﬁnite directed edge-weighted graph G= (V ,E,w), where the set of vertices V is partitioned
into two nonempty subsets VMAX, VMIN, every vertex has at least one outgoing edge (i.e., there are no sinks or leaves),
and w : E → R is the edge weight (or cost) function.3 An MPG is a pair (G, v0), where v0 ∈ V is distinguished as
the start vertex. Thus a game graph deﬁnes |V | games with different start vertices.
Given an MPG (G, v0), a play develops in the following way. Initially, a pebble is placed in the start vertex v0
and players MAX and MIN begin constructing an inﬁnite sequence of edges {(vi, vi+1)}+∞i=0 . If the pebble is in a ver-
tex vi ∈ VMAX then MAX selects an outgoing edge from vi and moves the pebble to its destination vertex vi+1;
otherwise MIN makes the analogous choice and move. A (general) strategy of a player is a rule of selecting successor
vertices in a play, as a function of the whole history of the preceding play.
Players MAX and MIN are adversaries, MAX wants to maximize (over all possible strategies), whereas MIN wants to
minimize, the values MAX(G, v0) and MIN(G, v0) deﬁned, respectively, as
MAX(G, v0) = liminf
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
i=0
w(vi, vi+1) and MIN(G, v0) = limsup
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
i=0
w(vi, vi+1). (1)
A pure positional strategy  of a player is a selection of exactly one outgoing edge (v, (v)) (equivalently, of
successor vertex (v)) for each vertex v he owns. If a player commits himself to a positional strategy, then every time
the pebble in a play comes to a vertex v, he deterministically chooses the same successor (v), independently of the
strategy used by the adversary and of the history of the play. In contrast, a general strategy may depend on the whole
history of the play and use randomization.
2 Most of the results mentioned here were obtained during numerous visits to DIMACS in 2004–2005, hosted by Leonid.
3 Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [21], Moulin [43], as well as Gurvich et al. [27] assume real edge weights ([27] also treats the case of integer
weights separately), whereas other researchers [56,46,13] assume integer (equivalently, rational) edge weights, which is helpful in establishing
pseudopolynomial worst-case bounds. Some of the algorithms/bounds presented below will work/hold for both real and integer edge weights, some,
namely all pseudopolynomial ones, will be restricted to the case of integer or rational edge weights.
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An MPG is bipartite if E ⊆ (VMAX × VMIN) ∪ (VMIN × VMAX). A bipartite MPG is complete if the previous
inclusion ⊆ is equality =, and incomplete otherwise. As usual, the weight of a cycle is the sum of edge weights along
the cycle.
2.2. MPG values and positional determinacy
The following fundamental result was rediscovered several times.
Theorem 2.1 (Pure positional determinacy of MPGs). In any MPG G every vertex v has a value (G, v), equal
to both limits in (1), and players MAX and MIN possess optimal uniform pure positional strategies  and  such
that for every vertex v0 of G strategy  secures MAX(G, v0)(G, v0) against any strategy of MIN, and  secures
MIN(G, v0)(G, v0) against any strategy of MAX.
The strategies in Theorem 2.1 are called uniform, because they are independent of a start vertex, although different
start vertices may have different values, in general.
Ehrenfeucht andMycielski [21] who apparently coined the termmean payoff games, proved Theorem 2.1 (announced
in [20]) for bipartite MPGs (players strictly alternate moves). Moulin [44,43] independently proved Theorem 2.1 for
(possibly inﬁnite-graph) complete bipartite MPGs, which he calls ergodic extensions of zero-sum games. For MPGs
on ﬁnite non-bipartite graphs, Theorem 2.1 is a particular case of Gillette’s [26, Theorem 2, p. 184] or Hoffman–Karp’s
analogous result [30]. Theorem 2.1 also follows from [49] by reduction [56]. Gurvich et al. [27] gave a constructive
proof of Theorem 2.1 and an efﬁcient algorithm for computing values and optimal strategies of arbitrary (not necessarily
bipartite) MPGs on ﬁnite graphs. Other algorithms will be discussed below.
If both players stick to their optimal strategies then for every start vertex v0 the play is a (possibly empty) ﬁnite path
leading to a simple cycle, and both players secure the same value (G, v0), which is equal to the average weight of
edges on this cycle. Deviating from an optimal strategy does not give advantage to the deviating player, i.e., may only
decrease the gain for MAX, and increase the loss for MIN. Revealing an optimal strategy before a play starts is not a
disadvantage.
Finite version of MPGs. Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [21] also considered the ﬁnite version of MPGs. In a ﬁnite MPG
a play develops exactly the same way as an inﬁnite one, with the difference that it terminates as soon as some vertex is
visited for the second time during the play. When this happens, player MIN pays to MAX the value equal to the average
cost of the simple cycle formed. This version is a ﬁnite zero-sum game of perfect information, hence it has a value.
Moreover,
Theorem 2.2 (Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [21]). The values of inﬁnite and ﬁnite MPGs on the same graph starting in
the same vertex, as well as optimal positional strategies, coincide.
This is somewhat surprising, because intuitively, the knowledge of previously visited vertices in a ﬁnite play seems
important for closing the cycle optimally.4 Interestingly, the proofs of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 in [21] are based on a
subtle cyclic interplay between inﬁnite and ﬁnite MPGs. Both versions are used in [21] in order to establish claims
about any one of them. This cyclic dependency is eliminated in [9], where everything reduces to ﬁnite MPGs.
2.3. Straightforward algorithms
In principle, the existence of optimal pure positional strategies (Theorem 2.1) immediately gives several straightfor-
ward methods to ﬁnd the value of a vertex in an MPG. The ﬁrst one consists in verifying all pairs of pure positional
strategies for both players and ﬁnding a saddle point of the corresponding matrix (exponentially large in the number
of vertices, in general). The second one is based on the following polynomial time decidability of one-player MPGs.
Proposition 2.3. If one of the players ﬁxes his pure positional strategy, an optimal counterstrategy of the opponent is
polynomial time computable.
4 Compare with a PSPACE-complete GENERALIZED GEOGRAPHY.
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Proof. For a ﬁxed positional MAX strategy , let the graph G result from G by deleting all MAX edges not used by
. In every strongly connected component of G use Karp’s minimal average cycle algorithm. For every start vertex
v0 an optimal counterstrategy  against  consists in reaching a component with a minimal average cycle. For a ﬁxed
positional MIN strategy , in order to compute maximum average weight cycles in G, negate all edge weights and
proceed as above with Karp’s algorithm. 
Thus, it sufﬁces to verify all pure positional strategies of a player who has fewer such strategies and select the best
one. This immediately gives
Corollary 2.4. For every MPG G, vertex v0 of G, and rational number q, the value threshold decision problem:
“whether (G, v0)> q?” is a member of the NP∩ coNP complexity class. (The relation > may be replaced by any of
 , <,  .)
Proof. Short witnesses for YES/NO instances are MAX/MIN pure positional strategies, respectively. Optimal counter-
strategies are computed in polynomial time as explained in the proof of Proposition 2.3. This allows for verifying that
the value is above/below the threshold. 
2.4. Gurvich–Karzanov–Khachiyan’s algorithm
Gurvich et al. [27] suggested a constructive proof of Theorem 2.1 (for the general, non-bipartite case). Their proof
gives an efﬁcient and nontrivial algorithm for computing values and optimal strategies, based on the so-called potential
transformations.Given anMPGgraphG=(V ,E,w), apotential is a function ε : V → R, and apotential transformation
is a change of edge weights according to the rule
w′(u, v) = w(u, v) + ε(u) − ε(v), (2)
where ε is a potential. Two weight functions w and w′ are equivalent if they differ modulo a potential transformation
(2).5 Potential transformations, obviously, donot change cycleweights andmeans (by telescoping). Therefore, potential
transformations preserve vertex values and optimal strategies. An edge (v, u) is called w-extremal if v ∈ VMAX and
w(v, u) is the largest among weights of edges leaving v, or if v ∈ VMIN and w(v, u) is the smallest among weights of
edges leaving v. Gurvich et al. proved the following
Theorem 2.5 (Gurvich et al. [27]). For every MPG G = (V ,E,w) there exist values p(v) = (G, v) for v ∈ V and
a weight function w′ equivalent to w such that:
(1) for every v ∈ VMAX:
(a) p(v) = max(w′(v, u)|(v, u) ∈ E) and
(b) p(v)p(u) for all (v, u) ∈ E, with  holding as = for every w′-extremal edge (v, u);
(2) for every v ∈ VMIN:
(a) p(v) = min(w′(v, u)|(v, u) ∈ E) and
(b) p(v)p(u) for every (v, u) ∈ E, with  holding as = for every w′-extremal edge (v, u);
(3) ‖w′‖∞2|V | · ‖w‖∞, where ‖‖∞ is the maximum absolute value norm.
When the equivalent cost function w′ from Theorem 2.5 is known, optimal pure positional strategies for both players
are obvious: each one can pick any of their w′-extremal edges. Clearly, deviating from an optimal strategy never gives
an advantage. An iterative algorithm constructing a sequence of potential transformations and computing values p(v)
together with the equivalent cost function w′ in Theorem 2.5 is described in [27]. Generalizations of MPGs, in which
each player can prohibit some prescribed set6 of the outgoing edges from each vertex of the opponent are described
in [35,46], where the existence of optimal positional strategies and values are proved, and associated algorithms,
generalizing the algorithm of [27] are presented. Pisaruk [46] proved that the generalized version of the algorithm [27]
5 Clearly, this is an equivalence relation.
6 Either given by a numerical quota of edges allowed to be prohibited in every vertex [35], or by an independence system of edge sets [46].
S. Vorobyov /Discrete Applied Mathematics 156 (2008) 2195–2231 2199
(proved exponential in that paper) is actually pseudopolynomial O(poly(|V |) · ‖w‖∞), assuming integral edge weights.
There are MPG instances (due to Gurvich and Lebedev; see [3]) on which the algorithm makes (poly(|V |) · ‖w‖∞)
iterations. Usually the algorithm converges quickly, similarly to the simplex method. Theorem 2.5 gives the following
useful.
Corollary 2.6 (MPG ergodic partition, [27]). The vertices of every MPG G = (V ,E,w) may be partitioned into
equivalence classes V1, . . . , Vk with corresponding values p1 < · · ·<pk and players MAX, MIN have optimal uniform
pure positional strategies ,  such that:
(1) for every v ∈ Vi ∩ VMAX strategy  uses an edge (v, u) with u ∈ Vi , and there are no edges from v leading to Vj
with j > i;
(2) for every v ∈ Vi ∩ VMIN strategy  uses an edge (v, u) with u ∈ Vi , and there are no edges from v leading to Vj
with j < i.
Thus if a play starts in a vertex v ∈ Vi , both players can stay in Vi forever, securing each value pi = (G, v);
player MAX cannot (unless MIN allows, by making a mistake), to move in a vertex with a larger value, and, symmetri-
cally, player MIN cannot unilaterally move to a vertex with a smaller value.
2.5. Zwick–Paterson’s algorithms
Zwick and Paterson [56] suggested a dynamic programming algorithm based on computing values in k-stepMPGs on
agraphG=(V ,E,w) as follows.Let 0(v)=0 for eachv ∈ V and k(v)=opt(v,u)∈E(w(v, u)+k−1(u)) for k > 0,where
opt ismax ormin depending onwhether v ∈ VMAX or v ∈ VMIN.Values k(v) approximate genuineMPGvalues (G, v)
for k=(poly(|V |) ·‖w‖∞), well enough to recover the latter from k(v) [56]. A pseudopolynomial (assuming integral
edge weights) time algorithm(poly(|V |) · ‖w‖∞) easily follows. Unlike Gurvich–Karzanov–Khachiyan’s algorithm,
which usually converges fast (simplex-like behavior), except for seldom degenerate instances (Gurvich–Lebedev’s
examples), Zwick–Paterson’s algorithm is always bound to make (poly(|V |) · ‖w‖∞) iterations. Otherwise, it is
incorrect on many easily constructible instances; cf., [56].
Another algorithm suggested in [56] is based on reduction to discounted payoff games (DPGs), similar to MPGs,
but MAX and MIN compete for maximizing and minimizing, respectively, the value of (1 − )∑+∞i=0 i · w(ei), where
0< < 1 and ei (i = 0, . . . ,+∞) is a sequence of edges traversed during a play. Values of an MPG G = (V ,E,w)
can be approximated by a DPG values on the same game graph G with an appropriately selected discounting factor
=1−1/(poly(|V |·‖w‖∞)). Solving the latter gameamounts toﬁnding auniqueﬁxedpoint of a contractivemapping7
in l∞, which can be done in pseudopolynomial time; see [56] for details. A further reduction from discounted payoff
to simple stochastic games (SSGs) is described in [56]. It allows for applying appropriate algorithms for solving SSGs
(to be considered below) for solving MPGs.
2.6. 0-mean partition problem for MPGs
To simplifymatters, in this paper we concentrate on the following simple restricted problem, called 0-mean partition-
ing, which nevertheless polynomially subsumes the problem of computing values of MPGs, as well as ergodic partition-
ing, and ﬁnding optimal strategies. It also simpliﬁes the algorithms, structure, and properties of the LP-representations
for MPGs.
0-MEAN PARTITION PROBLEM FOR MPGs.
Given: a bipartite MPG G without 0-weight cycles.
Find: a partition of vertices of G into sets G>0 and G0 of vertices with positive and nonpositive values.8
7 This is precisely the method used by Shapley [49] for proving the existence of optimal strategies in stopping stochastic games, of which DPGs
is a simple and full-information particular case.
8 Due to the absence of 0-weight cycles, there will be no vertices of value 0.
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Restricting to this problem, with the additional constraints as stated, is no loss of generality. We summarize it in the
following two propositions.
Proposition 2.7. Finding values of MPGs with rational edge weights is polynomial time reducible to the 0-mean
partition problem.
Proof. For an arbitrary MPG, adding a constant k to every edge weight adds k to every vertex value; multiplying every
edge weight by a constant k multiplies every vertex value by k. This is because values are deﬁned by mean values of
optimal cycles wrt positional strategies, and because every cycle mean changes by additive or multiplicative constant,
respectively. Therefore, partitioning with a rational mean threshold reduces to 0-mean partitioning.
Values of MPG vertices are rationals with numerators and denominators up to nW and n, respectively. If a value is
known to belong to an interval of length 1/n2, then it is uniquely determined. By dichotomizing the range [−W,W ]
with rational thresholds, polynomially many in n and logW times, each time invoking the partition algorithm, we may
uniquely determine the value of a vertex [27,56,13]. 
The proofs of the following useful simplifying claims are routine; see, e.g., [52].
Proposition 2.8. In the 0-mean partition problem the following assumptions can be done without loss of generality:
(1) the game graph has no 0-weight cycles,
(2) the game graph is bipartite,
(3) the values of all vertices are of the same sign, equal to the sign of the value of an arbitrary vertex v0 in the original
game;
(4) the game graph is complete bipartite (with |VMAX| = |VMIN|, if necessary).
(5) Every reduction, from a general MPG to the restricted cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 is polynomial.
For example, to achieve (1), multiply the weight of each edge by (|V | + 1) and subtract 1. Positive and negative
cycles will preserve their signs, and 0-weight cycles will become negative weight. (2) Can be provided by inserting
an intermediate vertex of the opposite player in every edge between two vertices of the same player. Although it
changes cycle means, it does not alter their signs, and by Proposition 2.7 this is enough for computing values. (3) Can
be guaranteed by throwing a new edge of weight M from every MIN vertex to v0, and an edge of weight −M from
every MAX vertex to v0, for M big enough. Then all vertices have the value of the same sign as v0 in the original game.
Note that in this case 0-mean partitioning attributes all vertices either toG>0 or toG0, and to ﬁnd 0-mean partitioning
in the original game amounts to repeating this trick for each vertex v0 ∈ V . Likewise, adding non-edges, of weight M
and −M for MIN and MAX, rendering a bipartite graph complete bipartite yields (4); see [52].
2.7. Stochastic and other cyclic games
Shapley’s stochastic games. For m ∈ N denote [m] = {i ∈ N|1 im}. In a stochastic game [49] there are
ﬁnitely many N positions, and players MAX, MIN have ﬁnitely many action choices, [mk], [nk], respectively, in each
position k ∈ [N ]. If in position k player MAX selects action i ∈ [mk] and MIN simultaneously selects action j ∈ [nk],
then MAX gets payment akij from MIN, with probability s
k
ij > 0 the play stops, while with probability p
kl
ij 0 the play
proceeds to position l ∈ [N ]. A particular game k is obtained by specifying the starting position k. Player MAX wants
tomaximize, whereas player MIN tominimize the total payoff, which accumulates during the play. Assume,
∑N
l=1 pklij =
1 − skij < 1 − s < 1, |akij |<M . Then the probability that a play does not stop after t steps is at most (1 − s)t , and the
maximal payoff does not exceed M = M∑∞i=0(1 − s)i = M/s. Generalizations, when the games are not required to
terminate are studied in [26,30].
Turn-based Shapley’s stochastic games. Simultaneous move stochastic games thus deﬁned are not perfect informa-
tion. In turn-based stochastic games, for every position k at least one ofmk , nk equals 1. For such a game, let k ∈ MAX if
mk > 1, k ∈ MIN if nk > 1. We call positions k for which both mk =nk =1 unary and arbitrarily let k ∈ MAX or k ∈ MIN.
Turn-based stochastic games are perfect information, solvable in pure positional strategies [49], and the unique value
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(optimal payoff) for every vertex is determined by the unique solution of the system
vk = max
i∈[mk]
(aki1 +
∑
l
pkli1 vl) for k ∈ MAX,
vk = min
j∈[nk]
(ak1j +
∑
l
pkl1j vl) for k ∈ MIN. (3)
SSGs [15] are similar to Shapley’s turn-based stochastic games above, but stopping probabilities skij = 0. Instead,
there are two sink vertices, 0-sink and 1-sink, without outgoing edges in which plays terminate. Starting in a vertex,
player MAX wants to maximize, whereas MIN wants to minimize the probability of reaching the 1-sink. An SSG is
stopping, if for any pure positional strategies of the players there are paths from every vertex to a sink. Stopping SSGs
are approximated by Shapley’s turn-based stochastic games, are solvable in pure positional strategies, and the value
threshold problem (whether the probability of reaching the 1-sink from a given vertex>p?) is in NP∩ coNP [15]. DPGs
(Section 2.5), and therefore, MPGs are reducible to SSGs [56].
Parity games (PGs) [23,22] are similar to MPGs, but instead of weighted edges, colors (natural numbers) are
assigned to vertices of a PG. Players MAX/MIN want to ensure that in any inﬁnite play the largest color appearing
inﬁnitely often is even/odd, respectively. Importance of PGs is explained by the fact that the so-called model checking
for the propositional -calculus model checking is polynomial time equivalent to deciding winners in PGs. Besides,
-calculus is an expressive logic subsuming most known propositional temporal logics of programs [22]. PGs are
determined and solvable in pure positional strategies [23]. This follows immediately from a simple reduction to MPGs:
turn a PG into an MPG by assigning every edge leaving vertex of color c weight (−|V |)c. Now MAX secures an even
color inﬁnitely often from vertex v0 iff in the MPG (G, v0)> 0, and Theorem 2.1 applies.
3. MPGs and LSPs
Recently, a new algorithm for solving MPGs, based on a very simple (although previously ignored or neglected)
generalization of the single-source shortest paths problem was suggested in [13]. The generalized problem9 is called
Controlled Shortest Paths or, alternatively,
LONGEST–SHORTEST PATHS (LSP).
Given: an edge-weighted directed graph G = (V ,E,w) with a unique sink10 t and distinguished set of controlled
vertices C ⊆ V , t /∈C.
Find: a selection ∗ of exactly one outgoing edge11 from each vertex of C, which maximizes the shortest distances
from all vertices to the sink in the residual graph G∗ obtained by removing all outgoing edges from vertices
in C except those selected in ∗.
Stated simply, the controller is allowed to delete all but one outgoing edge from each controlled vertex, and he wants
to do it in a way maximizing shortest distances to the sink in the resulting graph. As usual, positive- and negative-weight
cycles count as +∞ and −∞.
Additional assumptions/restrictions, which can be imposed without loss of generality for the purposes of solving
MPGs, are (cf., Proposition 2.8):
(1) every cycle in the graph contains both controlled and uncontrolled vertices (this holds, in particular, when the
graph is bipartite with controlled vertices being one of the partitions);
(2) every cycle has nonzero weight;
(3) there is an additionally provided initial admissible strategy 0 such that in the residual graph G0 all distances to
the sink are ﬁnite or +∞, i.e., in G0 there are no nonpositive-weight cycles.
9 Related generalizations were previously considered by Fulkerson and Harding [24] and Israeli and Wood [31]. In contrast to the LSP problem,
they either reduce to linear programming, or appear NP-hard.
10 A vertex without outgoing edges.
11 Called (pure positional) strategy.
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The reduction from the MPG 0-mean partition problem to the LSP problem is now easy to describe. Given an
instance of a bipartite MPG G without 0-weight cycles, add a new vertex t called the sink, and a retreat edge of weight 0
from every MAX vertex to the sink. MAX vertices become controlled. Denote the resulting LSP instance G′. The initial
strategy 0 consists in selecting retreat edges from all MAX vertices. The usefulness and correctness of this reduction
is provided by the following simple.
Proposition 3.1. For every bipartiteMPGGwithout 0-weight cycles the partitionG>0 consists exactly of those vertices
in the corresponding LSP instance, for which the longest shortest distances to the sink equal +∞.
Proof. The same pure positional strategy in G and G′ provides simultaneously for a positive mean and a +∞ distance
(positive cycle), respectively. Note that the absence of 0-weight cycles is essential in this argument.12 
So far everything seems trivial to the point of being useless, because the LSP problem does not seem to be in any
respect more convenient or easier to solve than MPGs. This is, however, a false impression. Besides the fact that the LSP
problem is a very natural generalization of the fundamental SHORTEST PATHS problem, there are two major advantages,
which were ﬁrst discovered for the LSP (and were not previously known for MPGs) [13,12]:
(1) there is a family of simple iterative improvement schemes for theLSP,which allow for solving it by a straightforward
monotonic (greedy or any other similar) improvement;
(2) this iterative improvement can be merged with the randomized subexponential algorithms for combinatorial linear
programming [33,34,39,40].
The resulting algorithm is simultaneously pseudopolynomial in the largest absolute edge weight W (for integral
edge weights, matching the previous asymptotically best algorithms [27,46,56]) and subexponential in the number
of MAX (or MIN, for arbitrary edge weights) vertices [13,12] (Section 8), which gives an advantage when weights are
large (or arbitrary reals). Moreover, the algorithm is randomized and hence is not prone to the worst-case behaviors
of Gurvich–Karzanov–Khachiyan’s and Zwick–Paterson’s algorithms (see [27,56] and Sections 2.4 and 2.5), which
match the pseudopolynomial upper bounds.
3.1. Iterative improvement for the LSP problem
Call a strategy  in an LSP instance G′ admissible if the residual graph G′ does not contain nonpositive-weight
cycles. For example, the initial “retreat in all vertices” strategy 0 above is admissible. For an admissible strategy  the
shortest distance in G′ from each vertex to the sink is well deﬁned and is either ﬁnite or +∞. Let (d(v1), . . . , d(vn))
be the vector of all these distances, which may be computed by the Bellman–Ford algorithm. We deﬁne an important
concept of attractive switches as follows.
(1) Suppose, for some controlled (MAX) vertex vi with (vi, vj ) ∈  one has
d(vi)<wik + d(vk), (4)
where vk is some successor of vertex vi reachable by the edge (vi, vk) ∈ EG′ of weightwik , and (vi, vj ) = (vi, vk)
(i.e., is not currently selected by strategy ). In this case we say that a strategy (single) switch from  to ′, obtained
by replacing the edge (vi, vj ) with (vi, vk), is attractive.
(2) More generally, suppose for a nonempty set I of indices of MAX vertices and each i ∈ I with (vi, vji ) ∈ 
one has
d(vi)<wiki + d(vki ), (5)
12 Otherwise, a 0-weight/mean cycle corresponds to the +∞ distance. Specifying that 0-weight cycles give distance 0 in the LSP instances,
although they make the sink unreachable, does not help.
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where vki is some successor of vertex vi reachable by the edge (vi, vki ) ∈ EG′ of weight wiki , and (vi, vji ) =
(vi, vki ) (i.e., it is not currently selected by strategy ). In this case we say that a strategy (multiple) switch from 
to ′, obtained by simultaneously replacing the edges (vi, vji ) with (vi, vki ), is attractive.
The ﬁrst fundamental fact about attractive switches (to be proved below as Theorem 6.2 in a more general form, by
using an LP formulation) is proﬁtability. Say that a switch from a strategy  to ′ is proﬁtable if for every vertex vi one
has d(vi)d′(vi), with strict inequality for at least one vertex.
Theorem 3.2 (Björklund and Vorobyov [13]). Every attractive switch is proﬁtable.
Thus making attractive switches provides for a monotonic distances improvement and terminates, in the case of
integral edge weights, after pseudopolynomially many O(poly ·W) steps (in the largest absolute edge weightW), since
edge weights are integral, distances increase in integral steps, and there is an obvious upper bound on the largest ﬁnite
weight of a path in a ﬁnite graph, after which the distance becomes +∞ (i.e., a positive-weight cycle is found).
Note that making iterative improvement by attractive switches is easy. Start in an admissible strategy . Compute
shortest paths to the sink in G′, by using any available algorithm, e.g., Bellman–Ford’s. Find any attractive switch
(single or multiple) by testing easy-to-verify conditions (4) or (5), and make it (terminate if there are none). Start over
from the new strategy. Improvements to the straightforward iterative applications of the Bellman–Ford algorithm are
described in [13], which explains how the more efﬁcient Dijkstra algorithm can be applied incrementally.
The second fundamental fact about attractive switches is global optimality of stable strategies, i.e., strategies without
attractive switches.
Theorem 3.3 (Björklund and Vorobyov [13]). In an LSP instance without 0-weight cycles every admissible stable
strategy ∗ is globally optimal, i.e., for every other strategy ′ and every vertex one has d′(v)d∗(v).
We will prove it later as Theorem 6.3, in the context of controlled LP.
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 justify a whole family13 of iterative improvement pseudopolynomial algorithms for the LSP
and MPG problems, matching the worst-case bounds of algorithms [27,56]. We describe the ﬁrst subexponential one
(and simultaneously pseudopolynomial) in [13] and in Section 8.
4. LP-formulations and LP-polytopes for MPGs
A natural representation of MPGs by means of linear constraints we are going to introduce, was apparently never
considered and studied before (see the recent [11,52]). It yields, however, several nontrivial algorithms for MPGs and
other games to be discussed below.
4.1. Linear slack constraints
The next deﬁnition does not assume that an MPG is bipartite nor complete.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Linear slack constraints). For an MPG G let SG, called linear slack constraints, be the following
system of linear constraints:
(1) for every edge x w→ v with x ∈ VMAX write constraints
x = v + wxv + sxv , (6)
sxv0; (7)
13 Follow any policy of making attractive switches.
2204 S. Vorobyov /Discrete Applied Mathematics 156 (2008) 2195–2231
(2) similarly, for every edge y w→ v with x ∈ VMIN write constraints
y + s′yv = v + w′yv , (8)
s′yv0. (9)
Variables sxv and s′yv are called edge slack variables.
The intuition behind these constraints is obvious: we want to say that x = max(v1 + wxv1 , . . . , vk + wxvk ) for
every MAX vertex x with successors v1, . . . , vk and y = min(v1 + w′yv1 , . . . , vl + w′yvl ) for every MIN vertex y with
successors v1, . . . , vl . Actually, the constraints above say just xv1+wxv1 , . . . , vk+wxvk and yv1+w′yv1 , . . . , vl+
w′yvl . Some extra means are needed to express the max and min functions. We do it later by using: (1) tight solutions
to linear programs (this section and Section 4.2), (2) linear complementarity (Section 5), and (3) controlled linear
programming (Section 6).
Let us adopt a convention that primed s′ andw′ denote MIN slacks and weights of edges outgoing from MIN vertices,
whereas s, w denote MAX slacks and weights. In the sequel we will freely identify edges with their corresponding
equality constraints.
The simpleLP-formulation above allowsus to derivemany interestingMPGproperties and algorithms, to be discussed
below. We start with a very simple, but useful
Proposition 4.2. For a cycle in an MPG G let wi , si , s′i (for i ∈ I ) be weights of all edges, all MAX and MIN slacks
on the cycle. Then SG implies∑
i∈I
wi +
∑
i∈I
si −
∑
i∈I
s′i = 0. (10)
Proof. Sum up left- and right-hand sides of the equalities (6), (8) corresponding to edges on the cycle. 
This proposition partially explainswhy the bipartiteness requirement (cf., Proposition 2.8) is useful. Indeed,whenever
a positive-weight cycle traverses only MAX vertices in G, or a negative-weight cycle traverses only MIN vertices, the
system SG is infeasible, because (10) cannot be satisﬁed.
With the introductory purpose of explaining the usefulness of linear slack constraints, let us temporarily assume
complete bipartiteness of the game graph. Say that a solution to a linear slack system is tight for MAX (for MIN,
respectively), if for every MAX vertex (MIN vertex, respectively) at least one outgoing edge has slack zero (we call such
edges and corresponding constraints tight). The following proposition shows how tight solutions determine the winner.
Proposition 4.3. If the system of slack constraints has a tight solution for
(1) MAX, then MAX can enforce a nonnegative cycle in the corresponding MPG from every vertex;
(2) MIN, then MIN can enforce a nonpositive cycle in the corresponding MPG from every vertex.
Proof. Let MAX use any “tight” edges (with zero slacks) as his strategy. Then, by (10), for every cycle that MIN can
create the sum of edge weights on the cycle is nonnegative. The proof of the second claim is analogous. 
Section 4.2 addresses the existence of tight solutions for the MPG linear slack constraints.
Now we can introduce MPG-polyhedra.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (MPG-polyhedron). AnMPG-polyhedron is the feasible set of the linear slack constraints corresponding
to an MPG; see Deﬁnition 4.1.
We have seen above that for some MPGs their polyhedra can be empty. Theorem 4.9 below shows that bipartite
MPGs always have nonempty polyhedra. Here we state simple properties of MPG-polyhedra.
Proposition 4.5. An MPG-polyhedron has no vertices.
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Proof. Suppose (x, y, s) is a vertex. Then (x + 1, y + 1, s), where 1 is a vector of ones,  ∈ R, is also a feasible
solution to slack constraints. Thus, any MPG-polyhedron with every feasible point v contains a line through v, hence
has no vertices. 
In Section 4.2 we introduce additional bounding constraints and an MPG-polyhedron becomes an MPG-polytope
(bounded polyhedron), with vertices.
Another useful property of MPG-polyhedra is their integrality.
Proposition 4.6. For any MPG-polyhedron P one has conv(P ) = conv(PI ).
Proof. Any MPG-generated linear slack system can be written as [A I ](xT, yT, sT)T = b, where the entries in A
correspond to x and y variables, and the identity matrix corresponds to the slacks. Every row of A has exactly one +1
and one −1 entry and is thus totally unimodular. Total unimodularity for [A I ] follows directly, since it is preserved
when adding a column with at most one nonzero, being ±1 [47, p. 280]. By [47, Theorem 19.1, p. 266], the polyhedron
{v|[A I ]vb} is integral whenever b is integral. Duplicating a row and multiplying a row with −1 preserves total
unimodularity, consequently the polyhedron {v|[A I ]v = b} is integral. 
As a consequence, any linear function over an MPG-polyhedron with ﬁnite optimum, has an integral optimum.
Moreover, optimizing any linear function over an MPG-polyhedron can be done in strongly polynomial time, because
the constraint matrix consists of 0 and ±1 entries.
4.2. Existence of tight solutions
In this section we consider linear slack systems corresponding to bipartite (not necessarily complete) MPGs and
show that they possess tight feasible solutions of bounded size. We ﬁrst generalize the notion of tightness, introduced
(for the case of complete bipartite MPGs) in the previous section.
Deﬁnition 4.7 (Tight solution). Given a linear slack system SG obtained from a bipartite MPG G without 0-weight
cycles, say that a solution to SG is tight if there is a partition of vertices of G into sets X and N such that:
(1) every MIN vertex in X has a tight edge to X;
(2) every MAX edge from X leads to X;
(3) every MAX vertex in N has a tight edge to N;
(4) every MIN edge from N leads to N.
(Note that in the case of a complete bipartite MPG either X or N is empty.)
A tight solution to a slack system gives the 0-mean partitioning for the associated MPG as shown in the following
Proposition 4.8. G>0 = N and G0 = X.
Proof. If a play starts in N, then MAX may just use his tight edges to stay in N. When a cycle is eventually formed,
by (10), the sum of weights on the cycle is positive (there are no 0-weight cycles); hence, the mean is also positive.
Symmetrically, if a play starts in X, then MIN just uses his tight edges to stay in X. When a cycle is eventually formed,
by (10), the sum of weights on the cycle is nonpositive; hence, the mean is also nonpositive. 
Next comes the main result of this section. Although there are well-known general bounds on a feasible solution to
a system of linear constraints (if it exists) [47, Chapter 10], our bounds for MPG-generated constraints are stronger.
We also show that tight solutions of bounded size always exist.
Theorem 4.9 (Tight solution existence). A linear slack system of every bipartite MPG without 0-weight cycles always
has a tight solution with integral components of absolute value O(nW), where n is the number of vertices and W is the
maximal absolute edge weight.
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Proof. Add retreat edges, of weight 0, from all MAX vertices to the sink (new vertex), and of weightM=(2n−1)W+1
from all MIN vertices to the sink. The resulting graph determines an instance of the LSP problem [13] (see also Section
3). In this instance optimal positional strategies of both players create no cycles, because each cycle is either positive
or negative, which one of the players always wants to avoid (and can due to bipartiteness). Thus all optimal plays end
up in the sink, through a 0- or M-weight retreat edge. The unique [13] solution (with all components ﬁnite, because
every cycle is broken by one of the players selecting to retreat) determines a feasible solution to the linear slack system.
Optimal edges for both players have associated slacks equal to zero. Moreover, by the properties of the shortest paths
[13] and optimality for both players, the following conditions are satisﬁed for every edge (v, u) of the game graph,
because d(v), d(u) are shortest path distances:
d(v)w(v, u) + d(u) if v ∈ VMIN,
d(v)w(v, u) + d(u) if v ∈ VMAX. (11)
These conditions ensure that all slacks are nonnegative. Moreover, at least one slack per vertex is zero, since d(v) are
deﬁned by shortest paths.
Let the required sets X and N of Deﬁnition 4.7 be as follows:
(1) N is the set of vertices starting from which MAX can force a play into a MIN vertex from which MIN selects the
retreat edge with weight M, when both players can use tight edges only;
(2) X is the set of vertices starting from which MIN can force a play into a MAX vertex from which MAX selects the
retreat edge with weight 0, when both players can use tight edges only.
The graph on tight edges is acyclic, bipartite, spanning all vertices of the game graph, with leaves being vertices
selecting retreat edges. Therefore, N and X form a partition, which can be easily computed (after topological sorting)
by dynamic programming. We have to show that MAX has no edges (including non-tight) from X to N and MIN has no
edges (including non-tight) from N to X (see Deﬁnition 4.7).
Since X and N do not intersect and shortest distances inside them are deﬁned by tight edges, the choice of the weights
for the retreat edges implies the bounds on the values of MAX and MIN vertices in X and N summarized in the following
table:
X N
MAX [0, (n − 1)W ] [nW + 1, 2nW + 1]
MIN [−W, (n − 1)W ] [nW + 1, (2n − 1)W + 1]
In the left column, the common upper bound holds because the longest path in X may traverse at most n − 1 edges
of weight at most W. The lower bounds 0 and −W in the left column are due to the MAX retreat and to bipartiteness:
the best MIN can do is to go to the 0-value vertex via a −W edge. In the right column, the common lower bound holds
because the shortest path in N is through the M-weighted retreat and at most n − 1 edges of weight −W . The upper
bound for a MIN variable is due to the retreat weight, and for a MIN variable it is just W larger.
To show that MAX has no edges from X to N, assume, toward a contradiction, that MAX has an edge from v ∈ X
to u ∈ N . The bound from the table above together with (11) imply w(v, u)< − W , a contradiction, since W is the
maximal absolute edge weight. A similar argument shows that MIN cannot have edges from N to X.
Now delete the sink and retreat edges to return to the original game. All equalities in the associated linear slack
system are satisﬁed. This solution is tight as shown above. Note that some 0 slacks for some variables can disappear
(in the vertices where a retreat was taken).
Since a slack s is always equal s = x − y ± w, from the table above we conclude that all slacks are at most
O(nW). 
Remark. We can thus impose additional bounding constraints for all variables in the linear slack systems from
Deﬁnition 4.1. The feasible set becomes a polytope with vertices, which we call an MPG-polytope.
Proposition 4.10. An MPG-polytope of a bipartite game always has at least one vertex, which is a tight solution.
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Proof. Consider a tight solution, which exists by Theorem 4.9. Minimize the sum of slacks, which are equal to zero in
the tight solution, over the MPG-polytope. Obviously, the value of the optimum will be zero. Furthermore, the optimal
solution can be attained in a vertex of the polytope. 
Proposition 4.6 and [47, Theorem 19.3] yield the following simple
Corollary 4.11. Vertices of an MPG-polytope of a bipartite game are integral.
4.3. 0-in-out property
In this section we only assume that MPGs are bipartite, but not necessarily complete. Consider the following
interesting property, which stipulates that every vertex has at least one incoming or outgoing 0-slack (tight) edge.
Deﬁnition 4.12 (0-in-out property). Say that a solution to an MPG-generated system of slack constraints satisﬁes the
0-in-out property if
∀i ∈ VMAX ∃j ∈ VMIN (sij = 0 ∨ s′ji = 0) ∧ ∀i ∈ VMIN ∃k ∈ VMAX(s′ik = 0 ∨ ski = 0).
The two propositions below summarize interesting relations between tight solutions to systems of slack constraints,
solutions minimizing
∑
xi −∑ yi , and solutions with the 0-in-out-property.
Proposition 4.13. Every solution to an MPG-generated system of slack constraints, which minimizes∑ xi −∑ yi ,
possesses the 0-in-out property.
Proof. An xi with nonzero slacks on all outgoing and incoming edges can be decreased thus diminishing the target
value. Similarly, a yi with nonzero slacks on all outgoing and incoming edges can be increased thus diminishing the
target value. 
Proposition 4.14. To every MAX- or MIN-tight solution to an MPG-generated system of slack constraints there corre-
sponds a tight solution satisfying the 0-in-out property with a smaller or equal target value∑ xi −∑ yi .
Proof. A MAX-tight solution has 0-in-out property satisﬁed for all MAX vertices. If the property is not satisﬁed for
a vertex yi , then its value can be increased, keeping the tightness, and decreasing the target value. The proof for the
MIN-tight solutions is completely similar. 
Thus, both: (1) tight solutions (modiﬁed, if necessary as explained in the proof of Proposition 4.14) and (2) solutions
minimizing
∑
xi −∑ yi , satisfy the 0-in-out property. A plausible conjecture is that tight solutions can always be
found among those minimizing∑ xi −∑ yi . If true, it would allow for limiting the search space for tight solutions.
Unfortunately, it fails, as demonstrated by a counterexample in [52, Section 6].
4.4. Slacks update “tightening” algorithm
Despite the fact that there may be no tight solutions (solving MPGs) among those minimizing ∑ xi −∑ yi (see
the preceding paragraph), the idea to start from such a solution and transform it into a tight one seems quite tempting.
We now develop this idea and describe an algorithm for ﬁnding tight solutions for MPG-generated systems of slack
constraints, thus solving MPGs by Proposition 4.8. The algorithm applies to systems obtained from bipartite (not
necessarily complete) MPGs without 0-weight cycles. Correctness proof and the intuitions underlying the algorithm,
go in parallel with its description.
The Algorithm. (1) Find a solution to slack constraints minimizing∑ xi −∑ yi (in strongly polynomial time). By
Proposition 4.13, every vertex has at least one (incoming or outgoing) tight edge.
(2) Let X0 be the set of MAX vertices without tight outgoing edges, and N0 be the set of MIN vertices without tight
outgoing edges. If one of these sets is empty, the 0-mean partition is found (Proposition 4.8).
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(3) Temporarily delete all non-tight edges. Let X be the set of vertices starting from which MIN can force a play into
X0, and N be the set of vertices from which MAX can force a play intoN0. (Both may be easily computed in polynomial
time, as shown below.)
(4) We claim that X and N form a partition of the game vertices. Indeed, every vertex is an endpoint (source or
destination) of at least one tight edge. Note also that the graph induced by tight edges is acyclic (this follows from
Proposition 4.2, because a cycle with all slacks 0 should be 0-weight, absent by assumption). Topologically sort it,
and proceed from leaves (which are either in X0 ⊆ X or in N0 ⊆ N ) backwards, in the topological order as follows.
For a MAX vertex v with all successors already decided to be in X or N, put v to N if it has a tight edge to N, and to X
otherwise, and symmetrically for a MIN vertex. This classiﬁes all vertices as members of either X or N.
(5) Now, we have the following important properties:
• there are no tight MAX edges from X to N, by deﬁnition of X; equivalently, all MAX edges from X to N, denote them
Emax(X,N), are non-tight;
• there are no tight MIN edges from N to X, by deﬁnition of N; equivalently, all MIN edges from N to X, denote them
Emin(N,X), are non-tight;
• note that there may exists tight MAX edges from N to X, as well as tight MIN edges from X to N.
(6) If the set of edges Emax(X,N) ∪ Emin(N,X) is empty, the 0-mean partition is found: G0 = X and G>0 = N
(see Proposition 4.8), and the algorithm terminates. (This is possible if the graph is not complete bipartite.)
(7) Let 	> 0 be the minimal slack assigned to edges in Emax(X,N)∪Emin(N,X) (all such edges are non-tight; see
above).
(8) Now, either (1) increase the values of all vertices in N by 	, or (2) decrease the values of all vertices in X by 	.
This does not violate any constraints, and preserves the property that every vertex has at least one in- or outgoing tight
constraint/edge. Indeed, all constraints corresponding to edges from X to X and from N to N remain satisﬁed (since we
increase or decrease the values of variables in both sides of constraints by the same 	). Repeat from step 2.
Note that in step 8:
• at least one non-tight edge in Emax(X,N) ∪ Emin(N,X) becomes tight, but
• all tight edges in Emax(N,X) ∪ Emin(X,N) (if any) become non-tight.
(Therefore, we unfortunately do not have monotonic increase of the set of tight edges. However, once a vertex obtains
a tight edge, it keeps at least one tight edge forever. Thus, the set of vertices possessing tight edges monotonically
increases; see below.)
Consequently, we have the following invariants:
• if a vertex at some stage obtains a tight outgoing edge, then it will always have a tight outgoing edge;
• thus the sets X0 and N0 may only decrease (monotonicity!)
Every increase (in step 8) of values of vertices in N decreases the positive slacks of all edges leaving vertices in N0
and going to X, and the positive slacks of all edges leaving vertices in X0 and going to N (there is always at least one
such edge; otherwise the algorithm stops in step 6). Equivalently, every decrease (in step 8) of values of vertices in X
decreases the positive slacks of all edges leaving vertices in X0 and going to N, and the positive slacks of all edges
leaving vertices in N0 and going to X (there is always at least one such edge; otherwise the algorithm stops in step 6).
Therefore, after pseudopolynomially many steps at least one vertex in X0 ∪ N0 will obtain a tight edge and will leave
the set X0 ∪ N0 forever.
We summarize the above argument in the following
Theorem 4.15. The described algorithm is pseudopolynomial, O(|G| · n · W), where G is the size of the game graph,
n the number of its vertices, and W is the largest absolute edge weight.
Note, retrospectively, that this algorithm is similar in spirit to the iterated potential transformation algorithm of
[27] (proved exponential in [27] and pseudopolynomial in [46]). Our algorithm is based on different principles. Its
description, correctness, and worst-case analysis are considerably simpler.
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5. MPGs and linear complementarity
Quite surprisingly, a natural possibility, described in this section, of representing and solvingMPGs as instances of the
LCP was not considered and investigated until very recently; see [11,50,51]. Meanwhile, the LCP possesses a powerful
and well-developed theory [45,17], with bimatrix games being one of its hallmark applications. Unfortunately, LCP
algorithms are exponential, in general. Additionally, bimatrix games algorithms require the normal form representation,
exponential in the succinct extensive (graph) form. None of the numerous subclasses of restricted LCPs solvable in
polynomial time captures nontrivial games, like MPGs. The initial motivation for our research into the LCP theory
was to exploit a bulk of results and methods in this rich and well-developed area of mathematical programming and
apply them for cyclic games. The main contribution of [11,51] was to show that some LCP-based algorithms for MPGs
and related games can be proved subexponential and simultaneously pseudopolynomial (in the right-hand sides, which
contain edge weights of the game graph). Also, of independent interest to the LCP theory, [51] demonstrated for the ﬁrst
time that some nontrivial subclasses of the so-called P-matrix generalized LCPs can also be solved in subexponential
time (see Sections 7 and 8).
5.1. LCP constraints
The major problem one faces when attempting at formalizing MPGs as linear programs (cf., Deﬁnition 4.1) is an
apparent impossibility of expressing the max and min functions by linear programs. Note that (6)–(9) only express that
every MAX variable is no less and every MIN variable is no larger than any of the corresponding right-hand sides.
LCP theory provides a simple and adequate solution. Recall that an instance of the LCP [45,17] is as follows:
ﬁnd vectors w, z0 satisfying w = Az + q and wT · z = 0 (12)
for given square real matrix A and vector q. “Complementarity” reﬂects the requirement that whenever a component
in w or z is positive, its counterpart in the other vector should be zero.
To begin with, let us drop the constraint that matrix A in (12) is square and generalize the orthogonality wT · z = 0
condition by stipulating that
there are disjoint subsets Si of variables such that the product of variables in each subset equals zero, (13)
i.e.,
∏
s∈Si s = 0.
While clearly keeping the spirit of “complementarity”, this will simplify and streamline the explanation. The standard
form (12) is not so difﬁcult to obtain [11]. Alternatively, we can rely on the generalized LCP form; see Section 7.
Now, linear slack constraints of Deﬁnition 4.1 together with the complementarity conditions of the form (13) allow
us for easily expressing the required max and min functions. There is, however, an extra technical trick needed to do
that adequately (cf., Theorem 5.2). Similar to the way we introduced the sink vertex t and retreat edges of weight 0
from every MAX vertex to t in LSP instances (Section 3), we now additionally throw retreat edges of weight M (a big
enough positive integer to be speciﬁed later in (20)) from every MIN vertex to sink t and write the following constraints,
where indexed s correspond to slacks associated with edges.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (MPG-generated LCP constraints). An MPG G = (V ,E,w) with the set of vertices V = {1, . . . , n}
partitioned into subsets, VMAX and VMIN generates the following system of LCP constraints LCP(G).
MAX-constraints. For every i ∈ VMAX stipulate:
vi = si , (14)
vi = vj + wij + sij (for each edge (i, j) ∈ E of weight wij ). (15)
MIN-constraints. Similarly, for every vi ∈ Vmin write (for the number M > 0 deﬁned in (20)):
vi + si = M , (16)
vi + sij = vj + wij (for each edge (i, j) ∈ E of weight wij ). (17)
Slack nonnegativity constraints. For every i ∈ V and every (i, j) ∈ E:
si0, sij 0. (18)
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Complementarity Constraints. For every i ∈ V require:
si ·
∏
(i,j)∈E
sij = 0. (19)
In the constraints above variables vi correspond to vertices, constraints (14,16) to their retreat edges, and constraints
(15,17) correspond to non-retreat outgoing edges of vertices; constraints (18) ensure that all slacks associated to edges
are nonnegative, and (19) guarantees that at least one slack per vertex is 0 (“tightness”; cf., Sections 4.1 and 4.2).
As explained in Section 2.6 (Proposition 2.8), we may assume, without loss of generality, that an MPG has no
0-weight cycles and every cycle contains vertices of both players (which is guaranteed by bipartiteness).
Note that alternatively to the LCP-formulation ofDeﬁnition 5.1, we could have considered the problem ofminimizing
the nonconvex function∑
i∈V
si ·
∏
(i,j)∈E
sij
subject to linear constraints (14)–(18). Observe that this minimum is always 0 (Theorem 5.2), but the major compu-
tational challenge consists in ﬁnding one such minimum efﬁciently. Note that convexity of the target function would
immediately give us a polynomial algorithm.
5.2. Correctness of reduction from MPGs to LCPs
Here we prove the main theorem establishing the relation between the MPG and the solutions to the corresponding
LCP, underlying our LCP-based algorithms for MPGs. The proof is based on the potential transformation method14
and explains the choice of the MIN’s sink value M.
Theorem 5.2. Every solution to LCP(G) solves the 0-mean partition problem for the MPG G.
Proof. Let W be the largest absolute edge weight in G. Deﬁne
M = 1 + (n − 1)W . (20)
Assume we have a solution x∗ to LCP(G). From this solution we can easily ﬁnd the 0-mean partition as follows. Start
from a vertex v and follow zero-slack edges (to break ties, when there are several choices, select the leftmost one,
assuming that the retreat edges are always rightmost). Notice that since there are no 0-weight cycles, there can be no
cycles on which all edges have slack 0 (see Proposition 4.2). Thus we will eventually end up
(1) either in the 0-sink, in which case v is in G<0, the < 0 partition of G,
(2) or in the M-sink, in which case v is in G>0, the > 0 partition of G.
Note that exactly one of the two should happen for each vertex v. To prove this, let us make a potential transformation
of the edges of the game graph G′ (G with added retreats) by transforming the weight w of each edge u → v as
follows: w′uv =wuv − u∗ + v∗, where u∗, v∗ are values assigned to vertices u, v in the solution x∗. After this potential
transformation:
(1) every MAX edge u → v gets weight w′uv = −s∗uv , i.e., the negated value of the slack assigned in x∗ to this edge.
Indeed, u∗ = wuv + v∗ + s∗uv , hence wuv − u∗ + v∗ = −s∗uv;
(2) every MIN edge u → v gets weight w′uv = s∗uv , the value of the slack assigned in x∗ to this edge. Indeed,
u∗ + s∗uv = wuv + v∗, hence wuv − u∗ + v∗ = s∗uv .
14 Potentials were introduced by Gallai [48, vol. A, p. 126] for shortest paths problem. Potential transformations were successfully applied in
[27]; cf., Section 2.4.
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Therefore, after the potential transformation, allMAX’s edges becomenonpositive, all MIN’s edges becomenon-negative,
and 0-weight edges correspond exactly to zero slacks in x∗. Note that a potential transformation preserves the total
weight of any cycle, by telescoping. Thus 0-weight cycles do not appear (since they were absent).
Now delete retreat edges from the game graph, start from any vertex inG>0, let MAX stick to his 0-weight edges, and
allowMIN to use arbitrary edges (all of themare nonnegative). Since the graph is leaﬂess (wedeleted all sinks), every play
is inﬁnite and consists of the sum of positive cycles (recall that zero cycles are eliminated in the beginning). Therefore,
the mean value of any such play is > 0, as needed, no matter which positional or non-positional strategy MIN applies.
Similarly, if a play starts in a vertex from G<0, then MIN can stick to his zero-slack edges (none of which goes to the
sink). No matter what MAX does, he can only use non-positive edges and any cycle whose result is negative (again,
there are no zero cycles). Therefore, the mean value of any such play is < 0, as needed.
It remains to explain why we have to select the speciﬁc value of M described above in (20). Let us show that from
a MIN vertex u taking a retreat (its value in x∗ equals M) player MIN cannot reach any MAX vertex v that takes the retreat
(its value in x∗ equals 0). Suppose the contrary, that there exists a simple path 
 from u to v on which MAX only uses
zero-slack edges.15 After the potential transformation the cost of the path 0c′(
)= c(
)− u∗ + v∗ = c(
)−M + 0
(by telescoping). Hence, c(
)M . But this is impossible, because 
 consists of at most n− 1 edges and by the choice
of M in (20). Similarly, we prove that from a MAX vertex u taking a retreat (its value in x∗ equals 0) player MAX cannot
reach any MIN vertex v that takes the retreat (its value in x∗ equals M). Suppose the contrary, that there exists a simple
path 
 from u to v on which MIN only uses zero-slack edges. After the potential transformation the cost of the path
0c′(
) = c(
) − u∗ + v∗ = c(
) − 0 + M (by telescoping). Hence, c(
) − M . But this is impossible. These two
contradictions prove that the partition of game vertices into G>0 and G<0 is correct and show that the choice of M is
adequate. 
5.3. Pseudopolynomial slack update algorithm
The algorithm starts by solving, in polynomial time, the system of linear constraints LCP(G) (14)–(18) from
Deﬁnition 5.1, disregarding the complementarity constraints (19). The feasible solution found is then modiﬁed in
stages, by propagating “slack updates”, producing new feasible solutions, which satisfy more and more complementar-
ity conditions (19). Finally, when we have a feasible solution, which also satisﬁes all complementarity constraints, the
instance is solved. Implicitly, we are minimizing the nonconvex function “the sum of slacks products for each vertex”.
This minimization is not monotonic, we only make one term in the sum equal zero in each iteration. We show that each
iteration of slack updates (and therefore the whole algorithm) is pseudopolynomial, assuming integral edge weights.
Algorithms subexponential in the number of vertices are described in Section 8.
For simplicity we assume that the game graph is bipartite. At every iteration (propagation stage) we select an initial
vertex v that violates the complementarity condition, i.e., all outgoing slacks from v are positive. If there is no such
vertex an LCP-solution and the MPG 0-mean partition have been found. We start by decreasing all slacks from the
initial violating vertex v by their minimum. This immediately corrects the slack complementarity in v,16 and the value
of v changes as follows:
(1) if v belongs to MAX, then its value decreases, and
(2) if v belongs to MIN, its value increases.
Then we propagate the update upward, through incoming edges of v, as described below. During the propagation
stage all vertex values may either:
(1) only decrease, if the initial vertex belongs to MAX (decreasing stage), or
(2) only increase, if the initial vertex belongs to MIN (increasing stage).
This monotonicity property, crucial for the termination and pseudopolynomial worst-case bound, will become clear
from the description below.Note that in both types of stages slacksmaydecrease or increase, i.e., there is nomonotonicity
in slack updates.
15 We can throw away cycles from a non-simple path.
16 Although slack updates propagation may later return back to v.
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Fig. 1. Example of a slack update: the square MIN vertex on the left increases its value by 2, the incoming edge gets a 0 slack and the value of the
round MAX vertex increases to 5; two other slacks are updated accordingly. Starting from the increased value 5 of the round vertex, the value/slack
update will be propagated further upward, values of the other updated vertices may only increase.
Fig. 2. Example of a switch: the round MAX vertex on the left increases its value by 2, the incoming edge gets a 1 slack and the value of the
square MIN vertex increases to 4 (rather than 5), whereas the other slack becomes 0. Starting from the increased value 4 of the square vertex, the
slack will be propagated further upward, values of the other updated vertices may only increase.
After changing the slacks and the value of the initial vertex v, we are looking at all edges entering v and at their
slacks and decide, whether to propagate or stop slack updates.
(1) Suppose v ∈ MIN, so its value increases, say by d.
(2) Assume, an incoming edge (from a MAX vertex u) has slack sd.
(3) Then we can set s : =s − d and terminate propagation along this edge, because this does not introduce any new
violations, and may actually eliminate one if s = d.
(4) If d > s we need to propagate the value change upward, recursively. The exact procedure for these updates is
described in [11]. To clarify intuition, Fig. 1 gives a simple example of a slack update, in which the value of the
square MIN vertex on the left increases its value by 2.
When the stage terminates, we have at least one slack violation less, andwe repeat the abovewhile there are remaining
violations.
Critical properties. The algorithm relies on the following properties, which ensure termination, correctness, and the
pseudopolynomial worst-case bound.
(1) During propagation, switches may occur: some vertex switches its zero slack from one edge to another. Fig. 2
illustrates this situation.
(2) Every update stage terminates. Since we have constraints v= sv for v ∈ Vmax and u=M − su for u ∈ Vmin, and all
slack variables have nonnegative values, we know that no MAX vertex can have a value below 0 and no MIN vertex
a value above M. The update stages either monotonically increase or monotonically decrease values, in integer
steps. Since the graph is assumed to be bipartite, this ensures termination.
(3) Crucial property: every update stage upon termination eliminates one violation and does not introduce any new
violations. This ensures that the algorithm terminates linearly in many stages.
(4) Since M depends linearly on the largest absolute edge weight and the number of vertices, the algorithm is pseu-
dopolynomial.
The exact procedure for propagating these updates is described in full detail in [11]. Each stage diminishes at least
by 1 the number of vertices in which complementarity (19) is violated. This results in
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Theorem 5.3. The slack propagation algorithms terminates in linearly many (in the number of vertices) stages, every
stage is pseudopolynomial (in the maximal edge weight).
Together with Theorem 5.2 this gives a pseudopolynomial LCP-based algorithm for MPGs. This algorithm can be
transformed into a randomized subexponential one; see [11] and Section 8. In [11] we also show how to reduce the
LCP-formulation of Deﬁnition 5.1 to the standard square LCP-form (12), for the purpose of eventually being able
to apply standard LCP algorithms. Unfortunately, the resulting MPG-generated LCP instances of the standard form
(12) have matrices that are neither PSD-, nor P- [11],17 and standard LCP theory cannot help with anything better
than exponential algorithms for such LCPs. Our pseudopolynomial (from this section) and subexponential (Section 8)
algorithms appear to be better for such LCPs.
6. Controlled linear programming for cyclic games
TheControlled LinearProgrammingProblem (CLPP for short) [6,5,10] is a nice, natural, and powerful generalization
of theLSP (alternatively, controlled) problemconsidered in Section 3. TheCLPPmaybe considered a particular instance
of a more general concept of a Controlled Combinatorial Optimization Problem (CCOP). For a general deﬁnition of
the CCOP, consider a succinctly represented familyF= {Gi}i∈I of instances of a polynomially solvable optimization
problem. (Each instance Gi is obtained from a generic instance G by ﬁxing some controls and is equipped with a target
function.) Find an instance with the largest possible value of the associated objective function. The LSP (Section 3)
provides a concrete example of a CCOP as follows. Let the familyF = {Gi}i∈I consist of weighted digraphs, each
with source s and sink t. Find a graph inF with the longest shortest s–t distance (counting negative-weight cycles as
−∞, all other cycles as +∞). As a succinct representation, take a digraph G with a distinguished subset of controlled
vertices C, with t /∈C, and generate graphs Gi’s by selecting exactly one outgoing edge per controlled vertex. This
gives a compact representation of an exponential in |C| family of graphs.
6.1. The CLP problem deﬁnition
Let x= (x1, . . . , xn, xn+1, . . . , xn+m) be a vector of variables. Call the ﬁrst n variables controlled, and the remaining
m variables uncontrolled. Let pji be linear homogeneous polynomials with nonnegative coefﬁcients and variables in x,
and wji be real numbers. A monotonic linear constraint has form xip
j
i + wji . Such a constraint is called:
(1) optional, if xi is a controlled variable, and
(2) compulsory, if xi is an uncontrolled variable.
By introducing newvariables, wemay assume,without loss of generality, constraint bipartiteness, i.e., that right-hand
sides of optional constraints contain only uncontrolled variables, and, symmetrically, right-hand sides of compulsory
constraints contain only controlled variables.
Let S be a system of monotonic constraints with at least one constraint per variable xi in x on the left-hand side. A
controller strategy  consists in selecting exactly one constraint for each controlled variable.18 Denote by S() the
resulting system of constraints obtained by removing from S all optional constraints not selected by . Symmetrically,
an environment strategy is deﬁned as a selection of exactly one constraint per uncontrolled variable. We will usually
identify the controller with player MAX and the environment with player MIN.
Deﬁnition 6.1. An instance of the Controlled Linear Programming Problem (CLPP for short) is speciﬁed as follows.
Given: a system of monotonic constraints S.
Find: a controller strategy ∗ maximizing, over all his strategies, the value
max
x
(1Tx|S(∗)), (21)
where 1T is the all-ones vector of appropriate dimension.
17 See Section 7, where we obtain P-matrix generalized LCPs.
18 Such strategies are called pure, in contrast to mixed, i.e., do not use randomness.
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Remark. (1) We can make it more general by allowing the target function cTx with cT0. However, to provide for a
strict monotonic improvement (Theorem 6.2) we will need to actually optimize the function cTx + 1Tx.
(2) In some cases (like LSP, see below) when unbounded target values are possible, it is more convenient to extend
reals R with +∞ to R+∞ = R ∪ {+∞} by stipulating x < + ∞ for every x ∈ R. Instead of the real-valued function
in (21) we optimize the vector-valued target function x (the vector of all variables in a CLPP instance), i.e.,
max
x
(x|S(∗)),
with codomain Rn+∞ on which the relation < is extended coordinatewise.
(3) Alternatively, we may introduce auxiliary compulsory constraints xj M with M big enough. This will ensure
ﬁniteness, in all cases, of the target value (21). Large target values will be interpreted as “inﬁnity”.
Let Si be the set of optional constraints for controlled variable xi . The space of pure positional strategies for the
controller is isomorphic to the Cartesian product
P=
n∏
i=1
Si . (22)
To each strategy  in P we assign the value maxx (1Tx|S()), thus obtaining a function from P to R ∪ {−∞,∞}.
Solving the CLPP amounts to ﬁnding a maximum of this function. Note that this function is generally nonconcave.19
6.2. LSPs as a CLPP
An LSP problem instance (Section 3) is a weighted digraph G with a distinguished sink t and a subset C of controlled
vertices. A controller (MAX player) strategy is a selection of exactly one outgoing edge from each controlled vertex,
with the goal of making the shortest distances from all vertices to t as long as possible. Given an instance and a strategy
 of MAX in the controlled vertices, we assign values to vertices in the following way. Let G be the graph obtained by
removing all edges leaving controlled (MAX) vertices, except those selected by . If a negative-weight cycle is reachable
from v in G, then v gets value −∞. If only positive-value cycles are reachable from v, and t is not, then v gets value
+∞. Otherwise, we assign v the value of the shortest path from v to t in G. The absence of 0-weight cycles may
be assumed without loss of generality; see Proposition 2.8. In our reduction of MPGs to the LSP problem (Section
3) MAX can secure a value > 0 in the game exactly from the vertices for which he can enforce the +∞ path (positive
cycle) in the LSP.
Every LSP instance G can be rewritten as a CLPP instance S as follows. For every edge (u, v) with weight w in G,
let uv + w be a constraint in S. If u ∈ C, the variable u is controlled, otherwise it is uncontrolled. Finally, add the
compulsory constraint t0 for sink t. The value of a variable u in an optimal solution for S equals the length of the
LSP MAX can achieve for u in G. Thus the LSP is a simple particular case of the CLPP.20
In practical algorithms for MPGs and LSP instances, it is undesirable to solve a linear program in each iteration,
since more efﬁcient graph algorithms are applicable. The CLPP setting is, however, useful for reasoning about the
problems since it makes many proofs considerably easier; see Section 6.3.
6.3. Iterative improvement for the CLPP
Iterative improvement is a key method for solving CLPP instances. Call a MAX strategy  for a system S of CLPP
constraints admissible if S() feasible. To secure the existence of admissible strategies it sufﬁces to add optional
constraints xi − M for a positive number M big enough. Symmetrically, to guarantee ﬁniteness (boundedness) of
optimal values for all admissible strategies, add compulsory constraints xiM . After this augmentation infeasibility of
a strategy and unboundedness turn, respectively, into the big negative and big positive associated optimal target values.
19 As a function extended to the interior of the product of simplices (22). Concavity would have immediately yielded a polynomial time
maximization algorithm. Note that this function attains its maximum in a vertex of (22).
20 In the beginning of Section 6.3 we show how to avoid the problems of enforced positive and negative cycles, together with the associated issues
of inﬁnite values and infeasibility. When MIN can enforce a negative cycle, the system S() is infeasible for every MAX strategy ; when MAX can
enforce a positive cycle by , the maximal value of 1Tx on S() is unbounded.
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Iterative improvement proceeds by attractive switches. Assume  is admissible for a system of CLPP constraints S.
Find a ﬁnite optimal solution x∗ to the linear program maxx (1Tx|S()). Every optional constraint xipjii (x) + wjii
selected by  is satisﬁed by x∗ as equality: x∗i = pjii (x∗) + wjii (otherwise x∗ is not optimal). Let I = ∅ be a set of
indices of optional constraints. Suppose, for i ∈ I , the optional constraints xipkii (x) + wkii not selected by  are
satisﬁed by x∗ as strict inequalities: x∗i <p
ki
i (x
∗) + wkii . An attractive switch is a change of  resulting in a strategy
′ obtained by replacing the ji-th optional constraint in  by the ki-th optional constraint, for every i ∈ I . Note that
this deﬁnition allows for single, multiple, or all possible attractive switches. A strategy without attractive switches is
called stable.
The following fundamental fact about attractive switches guarantees monotonicity of iterative improvement.
Theorem 6.2. Every attractive switch from  to ′ is proﬁtable, i.e.,
max
x
(xi |S()) max
x
(xi |S(′)),
and at least for one i the inequality is strict.
Proof. Assume that a number of attractive switches, for variables xi , i ∈ I = ∅, are made, from strategy  to ′. Let
the variable assignment x∗ = argmax(1Tx|S()). For every switched variable xi , i ∈ I , we have the old constraint
xipi (x) + wi , and the new constraint xip
′
i (x) + w
′
i . Since the switches are attractive and constraints are
monotonic, it is easy to see that x∗ is a feasible solution to the new LP S(′), some components of x∗ can be increased
without violating the constraints, and the claim follows. 
Proﬁtability of attractive switches for the LSP iterative improvement (Theorem 3.2) is now a corollary. Note that the
original (non-CLPP-based) proof in the preliminary TR version of [13] was quite involved.
Any sequence of attractive switches is thusmonotonic, and should always terminate in a stable strategy (not necessarily
unique), because the set of pure positional strategies is ﬁnite (although exponential). Making attractive switches is
similar to monotonic local search, which is guaranteed to terminate in a local maximum. In several important cases
stable strategies are optimal, i.e., every local optimum is global. Some cases are summarized in the following
Theorem 6.3. Every admissible stable strategy ∗ is optimal, i.e., for any 
max(1Tx|S()) max(1Tx|S(∗))
in the following classes of CLPP instances.
(1) Zero-cycle-free univariate CLPPs consist of inequalities of one of the forms
xixj + wij (edge constraint), (23)
xiwi (sink constraint) (24)
and the directed graph in which every constraint (23) generates an edge (xi, xj ) of weight wij , has no 0-weight cycles.
(2) Discounted CLPPs consist of inequalities of the form
xi(aji )
Tx + wji ,
where the vector aji 0 is discounted, i.e., 1Ta
j
i < 1.
Proof. (1). The proof of this case relies on the method of potential transformations [27]. Suppose,  is a stable strategy
in S. Consider the potential q deﬁned on variables by giving them the respective values of a ﬁnite (by assumption in
the beginning of Section 6.3) optimal solution x∗ to maxx (1Tx|S()). For every edge/constraint uw + v in S()
the potentials satisfy q(u)w + q(v), with equalities for the tight constraints (e.g., for those selected in ). Deﬁne an
optimal counterstrategy () for MIN as any selection of exactly one tight constraint (satisﬁed by x∗ as equality) per
his variable. Make the potential transformation of the graph of S (the whole system S, not just of S()), by changing
the weight of each edge according to the rule w′u,v = wuv − q(u) + q(v). After this potential transformation: (1) all
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edges in  become 0-weight, and all other MAX edges become nonpositive (by stability of , q(u)q(v) + w for
all such edges); (2) all edges in () become 0-weighted, and all other edges of the opponent become nonnegative;
(3) weights of all cycles remain unchanged (by telescoping); (4) weights of ﬁnite paths v0, . . . , vl change by a constant
−p(v0) + p(vl) (by telescoping), hence the relation (< ,=, >), before and after the transformation, between costs of
two paths from the same vertex to a sink remains unchanged.
Let us assume, toward a contradiction, that  is not optimal and there exists a better strategy ′, providing for a larger
value of the target function, hence for a larger value of some variable v0. Suppose, MAX switches to this strategy ′,
but MIN persistently uses the same counterstrategy (). Now in the trace created from v0 uniquely determined by the
pair of strategies ′ and () every edge is nonpositive (after the potential transformation has been performed). This
trace may be:
(1) either ﬁnite, terminating in a sink (24); in this case the value for v0 is nonpositive, and this contradicts to the
assumption that ′ provides a better value for v0 than ;
(2) or inﬁnite; in this case the value for v0 must be negative; indeed, by assumption, the graph does not contain 0-weight
cycles, and this property is preserved during the potential transformation; since only nonpositive edges are used
by ′ and (), the only possible cycles formed by ′ and () are negative; hence v0 will have value −∞.
This contradiction shows that  is indeed an optimal strategy.
(2) Discounted CLPPs. The proof in this case is a nice duality argument.
For a system of discounted constraints S let us denote by Ŝ the dual system obtained from S by inverting inequality
signs  to  . Also, denote by S= the system obtained from S by replacing all inequalities with equalities. We
immediately have the following weak duality:
max
x
(1Tx|S()) min
x
(1Tx|Ŝ()) (25)
for every pair of MAX strategy  and MIN strategy . Indeed,
max
x
(1Tx|S()) max
x
(1Tx|S(, )) = min
x
(1Tx|Ŝ(, )) min
x
(1Tx|Ŝ()),
which is justiﬁed as follows.
• The ﬁrst and the last inequalities above are straightforward, because S() and Ŝ() are more constrained than,
respectively, S(, ) and Ŝ(, ).
• For any  and  the constraint systems S(, ) and Ŝ(, ) have square, non-degenerate matrices (by the discount-
edness condition). Note that every optimal solution x∗ satisﬁes all constraints in S(, ) as equalities (otherwise it is
not optimal); similarly, every optimal solution y∗ satisﬁes Ŝ(, ) as equalities. Hence, by non-degeneracy, systems
S=(, ) and Ŝ=(, ), considered as equalities, coincide and have x∗ = y∗ as their unique solution. It immediately
implies the equality maxx(1Tx|S(, )) = minx (1Tx|Ŝ(, )).
Let us now show that for a stable MAX strategy ∗ the value maxx(1T|S(∗)) cannot be improved by any other
strategy ′, i.e., ∗ is globally optimal. Consider x∗ = argmaxx(1T|S(∗)) and let a MIN strategy ∗ be a selection
of (tight) constraints in S(∗), one per variable, which x∗ satisfy as equalities (i.e., ∗ is an optimal counterstrategy
against ∗).
Since ∗ is stable, x∗ satisﬁes all optional constraints in S not selected by ∗ as inequalities  (because there are no
attractive switches, recall that attractive switches correspond to < inequalities). Therefore, x∗ satisﬁes (is feasible for)
Ŝ(∗). Consequently, maxx(1T|S(∗))minx(1T|Ŝ(∗)). Thus a stable strategy ∗ and an optimal counterstrategy ∗,
together with the weak duality (25) imply strong duality
max

max
x
(1Tx|S()) = min

min
x
(1Tx|Ŝ()),
and the global optimality of ∗ follows. 
Note a considerable simpliﬁcation of proofs due to CLPP formulations.
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6.4. Discounted CLPPs subsume stochastic games
As a corollary to the proof of Theorem 6.3.2, we derive the following
Theorem 6.4. Shapley’s turn-based stochastic games and SSGs are reducible to discounted CLPPs.
Indeed, the unique solution to (3) coincides with the unique optimal solution of the discounted CLPP (where variables
vk with k ∈ MAX are controlled):
maximize
∑
vk
subject to vkaki1 +
∑
l
pkli1 vl, for k ∈ MAX, i ∈ [mk],
vkak1j +
∑
l
pkl1j vl, for k ∈ MIN, j ∈ [nk].
6.5. Stability and optimality, subexponential algorithms
Recall that a strategy is stable if it has no attractive switches. We have earlier showed that game problems with
strategy evaluation functions for which stable strategies are also optimal can be solved in randomized subexponential
time [8,7,13,4]. It turns out that the same is true for the CLPP. Not all CLPP instances have this nice property, but a
number of interesting subclasses do. This is studied in detail in Sections 7.7 and 8.
Suppose we are given some combinatorial optimization problem, and want to know whether its decision version
belongs to NP∩ coNP and has subexponential algorithms. The CLPP and stability give us a useful tool. First, we try
to write the problem as a CLPP, and then check if stable strategies are optimal. If they are, the problem whether the
optimal value is >B belongs to NP∩ coNP. Indeed, a short witness for a YES-instance is a strategy providing for a
value >B; a NO-instance is witnessed by a stable (hence optimal) strategy yielding a value B.
As we discuss in Sections 7.7 and 8, the subexponential analysis of the algorithms, adapted from combinatorial linear
programming relies on the fact that once a local optimum of a subsystem (with a subset of the original constraints)
has been found, we never need to return to a strategy in the subsystem. When stability does not imply optimality, this
property no longer holds, and the algorithms might even fail to correctly ﬁnd an optimum.
6.6. NP-hardness for non-monotonic CLPPs
In the deﬁnition of the CLPP we stipulate that all variable coefﬁcients in the constraints are nonnegative. This
restriction is essential for efﬁciency. In fact, by reduction from 3-SAT we prove [6] the following
Theorem 6.5. If negative unit coefﬁcients are allowed in the right-hand sides of CLPP constraints then the problem
becomes NP-hard.
It might seem that any polynomial optimization problem can be easily turned into a controlled version. However, we
show that usually this will result in an NP-hard problem. An instance of the CONTROLLED MAX BIPARTITE MATCHING
problem, is given by a bipartite, undirected graph G= (V = (A∪B),E), a subset C ⊆ A of controlled vertices, and a
function c : C → N that for each controlled vertex says how many incident edges the controller is allowed to remove,
trying to minimize the resulting maximum matching. This problem is NP-hard [6], by reduction from SET COVER.
The polynomial time solvable MAXIMUM FLOW problem can be easily expressed by linear programs, but not in the
form of monotonic constraint we allow in the CLPP. Skew symmetry and ﬂow preservation constraints require negative
coefﬁcients (so Theorem 6.5 hints it may be NP-hard). Actually, no matter which representation tricks one tries to use,
negative coefﬁcients are unavoidable. Indeed, CONTROLLED MAXIMUM FLOW (given a ﬂow network, together with a
subset C of the vertices and a function c : C → N, remove c(v) or fewer outgoing edges from every v ∈ C in a way
that minimizes the maximum ﬂow in the remaining network) is also NP-hard [6].
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7. Generalized linear complementarity for cyclic games
The generalized, alternatively, vertical LCP is an extension of the LCP (see Section 5). It was ﬁrst introduced and
studied by Cottle and Dantzig [16]. The generalized LCP is not limited to square matrices and binary complementarity
conditions as in (12). As a consequence, it is more suitable for expressing games played on a graph with arbitrary vertex
outdegrees, without ﬁrst reducing them to binary ones; see [11,10]. In order to state the GLCP problem, we will need
the deﬁnition of a vertical block matrix.
Deﬁnition 7.1. A vertical block matrix of type (p1, . . . , pk) is a real block matrix
A =
⎡
⎣A
1
...
Ak
⎤
⎦
with the j-th block Aj of order pj × k. Thus for p =∑kj=1 pj the matrix A has order p × k.
Note that in matrix A the number of blocks equals the number of columns.
Deﬁnition 7.2 (GLCP/VLCP). The generalized or vertical LCP is speciﬁed as follows:
Given: a vertical block matrix A of type (p1, . . . , pk) and a constant vector q decomposed in conformity with A:
q =
⎡
⎣
q1
...
qk
⎤
⎦
Find: a vector w ∈ Rp (decomposed as q) and z ∈ Rk satisfying
w = q + Az,
w0, z0,
zi
∏pi
j=1 w
i
j = 0 for i = 1, . . . , k, (generalized complementarity) (26)
where p =∑ki=1 pi .
The standard LCP (12) is a special case of the GLCP (26), with all blocks of size 1 and square matrix A.
Many results of the GLCP critically depend on the matrix structure. The analysis of the matrix structure of a GLCP,
often boils down to the investigation of representative submatrices.
Deﬁnition 7.3 (Representative submatrix). A square submatrix M of a vertical blockmatrixA is called a representative
submatrix if its i-th row is drawn from Ai , the i-th block of A.
The following classes of matrices are well investigated in the literature [45,17,38]. Every class is ﬁrst deﬁned for
square matrices and then the deﬁnition is extended in a standard way to block matrices by stipulating the property to
hold for all representative submatrices.
Deﬁnition 7.4. A square matrix M is
(1) a P-matrix if all principal minors of M are positive;
(2) a Z-matrix if all off-diagonal elements of M are nonpositive; if M also is a P-matrix it is called a K-matrix;
(3) strictly row diagonally dominant if |Mii |>∑j =i |Mij | for each row i;
(4) diagonally positive if all diagonal elements of M are positive.
A vertical block matrix is a P-matrix, Z-matrix, etc., if all its representative submatrices are square P-matrices, Z-
matrices, etc., respectively.
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Fig. 3. The structure of a D-matrix.
The property of being a P-matrix is coNP-complete [18]. Megiddo [41] showed that if P-matrix LCPs are NP-
hard then NP = coNP. Despite extensive efforts [38,42], there are no polynomial, even subexponential algorithms for
the P-matrix LCP, hence for the P-matrix GLCP. A recent progress was achieved in [51], where the ﬁrst nontrivial
polynomially recognizable subclass of P-matrix GLCPs (recall that the whole class of P-matrices is coNP-complete)
was identiﬁed and the ﬁrst randomized subexponential algorithm was suggested.
7.1. D-matrices and discounted GLCPs
In [51] we introduced a new class of vertical matrices and corresponding GLCPs called discounted, D-matrices and
DGLCPs for short. We demonstrated that D-matrices are P-matrices, and unique solutions to DGLCPs can be found
in randomized subexponential time, which cannot be done (at least not known yet) for general P-matrices [42] (see
Section 8.6). We also showed that stopping simple stochastic games (as general as SSGs) are easily expressible as
D-matrix GLCPs.
Deﬁnition 7.5 (Discounted vertical matrix, discounted LCP). A vertical block matrix N is discounted, or D-matrix, if
N is of the form depicted in Fig. 3 and has the following properties:
(1) all elements of N are nonnegative;
(2) every representative submatrix of N has a unit main diagonal;
(3) the remaining nonzero entries are located in the gray area;
(4) N is strictly row diagonally dominant.
A D-matrix GLCP is called discounted GLCP, or DGLCP for short.
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Remark. Note that the property of being a D-matrix is easily polynomial time recognizable. Assuming the unit main
diagonal is just a matter of technical convenience. Indeed, if other properties are satisﬁed for N, then multiplying rows
of the GLCP w=q +Nz by appropriate positive constants yields an equivalent system w′ =q ′ +N ′z, with a D-matrix
N ′. We will show that a D-matrix GLCP has a unique solution w′, z for each q ′, which allows for reconstructing the
unique solution to w = q + Nz.
Notational conventions. For the reasons, which will become clear shortly, the upper part of a D-matrix, consisting of
nk blocks, is associated with player MAX, and the lower part with player MIN. Thus the range of blocks and columns
is split between MAX and MIN. We will write i ∈ MAX or j ∈ MIN meaning that the corresponding index is in the range
of one of the players. By z|MIN we will denote vector z with all components of MAX replaced with zeros, and similarly
for z|MAX, w|MAX, w|MIN. By U
i
j or L
i
j , respectively, depending on whether i ∈ MAX or i ∈ MIN, we will denote the
j-th row in the i-th block of a D-matrix, with the 1 in the i-th coordinate (main diagonal) replaced with 0. We will call
vectors Uij and L
i
j discounted, because they have nonnegative coordinates summing up to a number < 1.
Note that by our conventions Uij z|MIN = Uij z and Lij z|MAX = Lij z.
Remark. When in Fig. 3 one of the partitions MAX, MIN is empty, every representative submatrix is the identity.
This case does not correspond to one-player games. One-player games are captured by Z- and ZD+-matrices; see
Section 7.5.
7.2. Reduction of turn-based Shapley stochastic games to D-matrix GLCP
Let us show that turn-based Shapley stochastic games (Section 2.7) are reducible to D-matrix generalized LCPs.
By introducing, if necessary, auxiliary unary positions between positions of the same player, and by appropriately
modifying stopping and transitional probabilities, we may assume, with no loss of generality, that the game is bipartite,
i.e., pklij > 0 implies k ∈ MAX and l ∈ MIN or k ∈ MIN and l ∈ MAX.21 System (3) is equivalent to
vk = max{−M, aki1 +
∑
l
pkli1 ul | i ∈ [mk]} for k ∈ MAX,
uk = min{M, ak1j +
∑
l
pkl1j vl | j ∈ [nk]} for k ∈ MIN, (27)
where we reﬂect bipartiteness by using variables vi and ui for i ∈ MAX and i ∈ MIN, respectively.
Let us introduce mk + 1 fresh auxiliary nonnegative variables zk, wk1, . . . , wkmk0 for each variable vk ∈ MAX,
as well as nk + 1 auxiliary nonnegative variables zk, wk1, . . . , wknk0 for each variable vk ∈ MIN, and rewrite
system (27) as
vk = zk − M for k ∈ MAX,
vk = wki + aki1 +
∑
l
pkli1 ul for k ∈ MAX, i ∈ [mk],
uk + zk = M for k ∈ MIN,
uk + wki = aki1 +
∑
l
pkli1 vl for k ∈ MIN, i ∈ [nk], (28)
additionally stipulating complementarity, i.e.,
zk ·
∏
i
wki = 0 for each k ∈ [N ].
Excluding variables vi , ui from (28), we can rewrite it as
wki = zk + P ki (z¯|MIN) for k ∈ MAX, i ∈ [mk],
wki = zk + P ki (z¯|MAX) for k ∈ MIN, i ∈ [nk], (29)
21 Although this may blow up quadratically the number of positions, unary positions introduce do not make worse the resulting complexity.
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where: (1) polynomials P ki (z¯|MIN) contain only variables zi for i ∈ MIN, (2) polynomials P ki (z¯|MIN) contain only
variables zi for i ∈ MAX, (3) these polynomials have all variable coefﬁcients nonnegative, summing up to < 1 (we call
such polynomials discounted). Note that in obtaining this form of system (29) we essentially use bipartiteness, which
guarantees that variables wki and zk appear with nonnegative coefﬁcients on different sides of equations.
7.3. D-matrices are P-matrices, solution uniqueness for discounted GLCP
Since every representative submatrix of a D-matrix has positive diagonal and is strictly diagonally dominant, it is a
P-matrix [17, p. 152]. Hence,
Proposition 7.6 (Svensson and Vorobyov [51]). Every D-matrix is a P-matrix.
A similar result is proved independently in [25]. However, [25] does not give any syntactic characterizations (similar
to our D-matrices) of the resulting class of vertical block P-matrices, besides showing that every stopping SSG (not a
polynomially recognizable property) translates into a P-matrix GLCP. Neither [25] provides any algorithms for their
class of GLCPs. So far the standard (G)LCP theory failed to produce anything better than exponential algorithms for
vertical block P-matrix (G)LCPs. Our randomized subexponential algorithm for D-matrix GLCPs [51] (see also Section
8.6) is the ﬁrst step in this direction.
P-matrix GLCPs have unique solutions [53], therefore ([51] gives direct alternative proofs),
Theorem 7.7 (Uniqueness). Every D-matrix GLCP has a unique solution.
Section 7.2 shows that the subclass of D-matrices is nontrivial. There are no currently known polynomial algorithms
for SSGs, hence for D-matrix GLCPs. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst nontrivial subclass of P-matrices for which
the GLCP can be solved in subexponential time; see Section 8.6.
7.4. Strategies, attractiveness, switches, stability
Informally, a strategy for a GLCP instance stipulates which of the complementary variables we want to nullify in a
solution.
Deﬁnition 7.8 (Strategy). A strategy i for the block i ∈ MAX is a selection of either i = {zi = 0} or i = {wij = 0},
for some j ∈ {1, . . . , pi}. A full MAX strategy  consists of selections i for all blocks i ∈ MAX and is denoted as
= {1, . . . , n}. A partial MAX strategy consists of strategy selections for some MAX blocks.
After selecting a strategyi for block i ∈ MAX,we have either zi=0 or zi=−qij−Uij ·z|MIN.Denote byGLCPi (N, q)
the system (N, q) with the i-th block and i-th column removed and remaining occurrences of zi replaced with 0
(if i = {zi = 0}) or with −qij −Uij · z|MIN (if i = {wij = 0}). Note that GLCPi (N, q) is not a DGLCP any longer, in
general. Given a MAX strategy  for all blocks we denote the resulting system, after removing all blocks of MAX and
replacing all z|MAX, by GLCP(N, q).
Note that after ﬁnding a solution w|MIN and z|MIN for GLCP(N, q), the values w|MAX and z|MAX are easily and
uniquely calculated by substitution but these values may be negative. The fact that some values are negative means that
we made a mistake in selecting a strategy and some switches have to be made.
Deﬁnition 7.9 (Attractiveness, switches, and stability). For a full MAX strategy, letw∗ and z∗ be the complementarity
vectors after calculating w|MAX and z|MAX from the solution of GLCP(N, q), as explained above.
(1) Say that a pivot to wij or zi is attractive, for i ∈ MAX, if w∗ij < 0 or z∗i < 0, respectively.
(2) An attractive switch for  in block i ∈ MAX results from making an attractive pivot, replacing i with ′i ={wij =0}
or ′i = {zi = 0}.
(3) The strategy  is stable if w∗ and z∗ are nonnegative, i.e., give a solution to the DGLCP(N, q).
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Making a partial (or complete) substitution of a strategy in a DGLCP results in a GLCP with a unique solution [51],
i.e., uniqueness is preserved:
Theorem 7.10. For aDGLCP(N, q)withmatrix N of orderp×k and n blocks of MAX, the resultingGLCP1,...,l (N, q),
for any MAX strategy 1,...,l (ln), has a unique solution.
7.5. One-player case yields discounted Z-matrices
We have a special restricted subclass of block Z-matrices resulting from substituting full MAX strategies in DGLCPs,
which deserve a special name.
Deﬁnition 7.11. A vertical block matrix is called a ZD+-matrix if it is
(1) a Z-matrix, i.e., all its off-diagonal elements (in the representative matrices) are 0;
(2) diagonally positive with all diagonal elements (in the representative matrices) in the range (0, 1];
(3) strictly row diagonally dominant.
Theorem 7.12 (Svensson and Vorobyov [51]). For every full MAX strategy  the system GLCP(N, q) has a ZD+-
matrix and possesses a unique solution.
Remark. Without loss of generality we may assume that ZD+-matrices in the statement of Theorem 7.12 have ones
on the main diagonals of representative matrices. Indeed, by multiplying equations of w = q + Nz by appropriate
positive constants we get an equivalent system w′ = q ′ + N ′z, with a unit diagonal N ′, which has a unique solution.
After ﬁnding this solution we uniquely recover the original solution for w.
Corollary 7.13. Every ZD+-matrix is a K-matrix.
7.6. Monotonicity: attractiveness is proﬁtable
Monotonicity of attractive switches/pivots (to be explained shortly) is the crucial property ensuring termination of
our pivoting algorithms and allowing for a subexponential runtime analysis. To simplify notation we make a convention
to denote solutions to the GLCPs before and after a switch as non-primed w , z and primed w′ , z′ , respectively.
Deﬁnition 7.14. The value val(w, z) of a solution (w, z) to a DGLCP equals
∑
i∈MAX
zi −
∑
k∈MIN
zk . (30)
Monotonicity of attractive switches guarantees that this value strictly monotonically increases, which immediately
follows from the next more general
Theorem 7.15 (Monotonicity, [51]). For every attractive switch/pivot in any DGLCP instance from solution (w, z)
to solution (w′ , z′) the following properties are satisﬁed:
(1) z′i − zi0 for each i ∈ MAX (monotonic non-decrease);
(2) at least one inequality above is strict, namely the one in the block where an attractive switch was made;
(3) z′k − zk0 for each k ∈ MIN (monotonic non-increase).
The proof in [51] essentially relies on discountedness (cf., Deﬁnition 7.5). It would be interesting to conduct it in
less restrictive assumptions, which will allow for subexponential algorithms for wider classes of GLCPs.
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7.7. Stability implies optimality for discounted GLCPs
The following result is essential for the correctness and complexity analyses of our subexponential algorithm for
D-matrix GLCPs in Section 8.6.
Theorem 7.16 (Svensson and Vorobyov [51]). In every DGLCP instance every stable MAX strategy determines the
same solution.
The proof is easy. Consider any two stable strategies in aDGLCP instance I. Since both are stable, they both determine
solutions for I, which should be equal by the Uniqueness Theorem 7.7. Note that we do not claim stable strategies are
unique, they are generally not.
8. Combinatorial linear programming and subexponential algorithms for cyclic games, controlled linear
programs, and LCPs
The very important uniﬁer for this work was a discovery that many inﬁnite games (including MPGs and all games
discussed in Section 2.7), as well as the LSP, the CLPP, GLCP with D-matrices, and other combinatorial optimization
problems have a favorable underlying abstract structure, which allows for reusing randomized combinatorial optimiza-
tion schemes for linear programming [33,34,39,40], although the corresponding functions are of a very different nature,
nonconvex and nonconcave.
8.1. Optimization on discrete structures
Combinatorially, the set of all pure positional strategies of player MAX in a game (MPG, or other), in an LSP, CLPP,
or (G)LCP instance is isomorphic to a product of ﬁnite sets, each representing the choices of one player (of an outgoing
edge in a vertex he controls, an optional constraint, or a slack to be set equal zero). The number of vertices of MAX
(or the number of controlled variables, or the number of slacks) corresponds to the dimension. Evaluating strategies
in games, LSP, CLPP, or (G)LCP instances motivates our study of functions deﬁned on the hyperstructures (products
of simplices). Hyperstructures directly generalize Boolean hypercubesH = {0, 1}d , corresponding to the particular
case of binary choices. In Deﬁnition 8.1 it is convenient to identify Pj with the set of outgoing edges from vertex j
(i.e., with the choices available to the player in this vertex) or with the set of optional constraints for a controlled variable
xj . Hyperstructures provide a useful abstraction capturing the combinatorial structure and simplifying the description
and analysis of algorithms.
Deﬁnition 8.1 (Hyperstructure). Let {Pj }dj=1 be a collection of ﬁnite nonempty disjoint sets. Call P =
∏d
j=1Pj
a d-dimensional hyperstructure (structure for short). An element of P is called a vertex.22 Two vertices of P are
neighbors if they differ in only one coordinate. A substructure ofP is a productP′ =∏dj=1P′j , where ∅ = P′j ⊆ Pj
for all j. A substructure P′ of P is called a facet of P if there is aj ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that |Pj |> 1, |P′j | = 1, and
P′k =Pk for all k = j .
In terms of games and strategies, a substructure of the strategy hyperstructureP corresponds to the set of MAX strate-
gies in a subgame in which some edges leaving vertices controlled by MAX have been removed, without creating sinks.
Moving from a vertex ofP to a neighbor is the same as making a single strategy switch in the underlying game. Similar
parallels can be drawn between hyperstructures and LSP, CLPP, (G)LCP instances.
Recall that a local maximum of a function f : P→ D is a vertex v such that f (v)f (u) for all neighbors u of v.
If f (v)f (u) for all vertices u ∈ P, then v is a global maximum of f on P. If P′ is a substructure of P then f |P′
denotes the restriction of f to P′.
22 Corresponds to a positional strategy, not to be confused with game vertices!
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8.2. Recursively local–global functions
We generalize [12] completely unimodal CU-functions [28,54]23 as follows.
Deﬁnition 8.2 (RLG-functions). A function f : P → R is called Recursively Local-Global (RLG) if on every
substructure of P every local maximum of f is global.
Note that RLG-functions are more general than Kalai’s abstract objective functions (AOFs) [34], because we do
not stipulate uniqueness of local maxima. Partial RLG-functions in Section 8.3 give an even further generalization.
Importance of RLG-functions is motivated by the following
Theorem 8.3. Every discounted CLPP induces an RLG function.
Proof. ACLPP instance S with n controlled variables and ni optional constraints for the i-th controlled variable induces
a function f : P→ R, whereP=∏ni=1Pi andPi = {1, . . . , ni} as follows. As explained above,P is isomorphic to
the set of pure positional strategies of the controller (player MAX) in S. For  ∈ P let f () = maxx (1Tx|S()), i.e.,
deﬁned by solving an LP. Let us note that the latter LP is always (1) feasible and (2) bounded, i.e., f : P→ R thus
deﬁned in a total function. Indeed, moving from any point in the direction d = (−1, . . . ,−1) will eventually satisfy all
the constraints, because by discountedness, the scalar product of d by a normal to any bounding constraint in S() is
negative. Moreover, this LP is always bounded, because for c big enough S()∪ {x|1Txc} is infeasible. Indeed, take
c >nB/(1 − 	), where B is the largest absolute constant in the right-hand sides of S() and 	< 1 is the largest scalar
product 1Ta among the discounted vectors a in the right-hand sides of S(). Suppose, xˆ is feasible forS()∪{x|1Txc}
and xˆi is its largest component. Then xˆi >B/(1−	). On the other hand, xˆiaTxˆ +b	xˆi +B, hence xˆiB/(1−	),
a contradiction. By Theorem 6.2, attractive (proﬁtable) strategy switches deﬁne total ordering of the values of f in
the vertices of P. Local maxima of f on P correspond to stable strategies. By Theorem 6.3.2, every stable strategy
∗ ∈ P in S is globally optimal, and this property holds recursively on substructuresP′ ofP. This is because substruc-
tures, recursively, correspond to CLPP (sub)instances S′ of S in which some optional constraints are deleted. Thus,
Theorem 6.3.2 recursively applies and the claim follows. 
The direct (inefﬁcient) way to deﬁne the f-improving directions between neighbors on P (to perform monotonic
local search) would be to solve an LP for every neighbor of the current strategy and to deﬁne switches to neighbors
with bigger f-values as improving. Theorem 6.2 suggests a more efﬁcient method based on attractive switches, which
requires solving just one LP in a vertex  ∈ P and allows for deﬁning improving directions (attractive switches are
proﬁtable, i.e., value increasing).
Reduction from stochastic games to discounted CLPPs (Theorem 6.4) gives
Corollary 8.4. Shapley’s turn-based and stopping simple stochastic induce RLG-functions.
8.3. Partial recursively local–global functions
In general, CLPP instances (e.g., those generated by the LSP problem instances) do not induce RLG-functions,
because their strategy evaluation functions are not deﬁned for every strategy (vertex of the associated hyperstructure).
We need to extendRLG-functions to cover this case aswell. Our extension [12] to partial RLG-functions simultaneously
allows for partially deﬁned functions, partially ordered codomains, inﬁnite values.
Deﬁnition 8.5 (PRLG-functions). LetD be a partially ordered set. A partial function f : P⇀ Dwith domainX ⊆ P
is called Partial Recursively Local-Global (PRLG) if, for every substructureP′ ofP, every local maximum of f |P′∩X
is also global on P′ ∩ X.
Theorem 8.6. Every zero-cycle-free univariate CLPP instance (cf., Theorem 6.3.1) induces a PRLG-function.
23 Recall that an injective function on a Boolean hypercube is CU if it has a unique local maximum on every subcube.
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Proof. Let S be a zero-cycle-free univariate CLPP instance with n controlled variables and P = ∏ni=1Pi be the
hyperstructure isomorphic to the set of pure positional strategies of the controller (MAX) in S. Deﬁne the valuation
f : P→ Rn+∞, where R+∞ = R ∪ {+∞} as follows. Recall (Section 6.3) that a strategy  ∈ P is admissible if S()
is feasible. For an inadmissible strategy  let f () be undeﬁned, whereas for an admissible one let
f () = (d(x1), . . . , d(xn)), (31)
where d(xi) is the shortest path to the sink in the graph G. The graph G is obtained from the CLP constraints S
by turning all variables into vertices and creating an edge (u, v) of weight w for every constraint uv + w in S. An
extra sink vertex t is added to G and a 0-weight edge is thrown from every MAX vertex to t. The graph G results
from G by deleting all edges from controlled vertices (variables) not in . Theorem 6.2 shows that attractive switches
on P deﬁne improving directions suitable for iterative improvement. Local maxima of f on P correspond to stable
strategies. By Theorem 6.3.1, every stable strategy ∗ ∈ P in S is globally optimal, and this property holds recursively
on substructures P′ of P. This is because substructures, recursively, correspond to CLPP (sub)instances S′ of S in
which some optional constraints are deleted. Theorem 6.3.1 recursively applies and the claim follows. 
By reduction from MPGs to LSP instances (Proposition 3.1) and since resulting LSP instances are zero-cycle-free
univariate CLPPs, we obtain
Corollary 8.7. MPG-generated LSP instances induce PRLG-functions.
8.4. Optimizing PRLG functions in expected subexponential time
By applying randomized optimization schemes for combinatorial linear programming [33,34,40], we obtain the
following result [12].
Theorem 8.8. A global maximum of a PRLG-function f : ∏nj=1Pj → Rn+∞, given 0 in which f is deﬁned, can be
found in expected subexponential time e2
√
n ln(m/
√
n)+O(√n+ln m)
, where m =∑nj=1 |Pj |. When m is polynomial in n,
then this time is 2O(
√
n log n)
.
Proof. The idea consists in modifying and adapting the randomized subexponential algorithm for combinatorial
linear programming due to Matoušek et al. [39,40] for the PRLG-functions (alternatively, Kalai’s randomization
schemes [33,34] can be used [7]). Note that in contrast to linear programming, the PRLG-functions induced by CLPPs
(in particular, those generated by SSGs) are neither convex nor concave.
Algorithm 1. MSW-style PRLG-function optimization algorithm
MSW (PRLG-function on P=∏ni=1Pi , and 0 ∈ P, where f is deﬁned)
(1) if |Pi | = 1 for each Pi , i = 1, . . . , n
(2) return 0
(3) choose a random facet F of P, not containing 0
(4) ∗ ← MSW (P\F, 0)
(5) if neighbor  of ∗ on F is attractive
(6) return MSW (F, )
(7) else
(8) return ∗
Algorithm 1 written in pseudocode is self-explanatory. It ﬁrst checks (base case) whether the structure P has just
one possible strategy 0 left. In line (4) it recurses on a substructure P\F obtained after deleting the facet F from P.
In line (5) it checks attractiveness of a switch to the facet F, previously thrown away. The algorithm always terminates
since the recursive calls in lines (4), (6) are made on strictly smaller substructures, and every switch in line (6) is
proﬁtable (monotonic improvement). It is correct since for a PRLG-function any vertex without better neighbors is
globally optimal. Any admissible MAX strategy 0 can be used in the initial call to the algorithm.
The subexponential expected running time follows from the analysis in [39,40]. It is based on solving a probabilistic
recurrence for the expected decrease of the so-called hidden dimension. The facets Fi not containing vertex 0 deﬁne
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the (acyclic) partial ordering by the largest value of the PRLG-function f onP\Fi . After choosing uniformly at random
such a facet and ﬁnding an optimum onP\Fi , the algorithm will never revisit any of the preceding substructuresP\Fj
in the ordering. We refer the reader to [39,40] for details. 
Note that the availability of an initial vertex in which a PRLG-function is deﬁned is essential. Consider a function
deﬁned in exactly one vertex of the hyperstructure. Finding this vertex cannot be done without full (exponential) vertex
enumeration. Fortunately, the MPG-generated LSP instances always have an admissible MAX strategy “retreat to the
sink everywhere” available (Section 3).
Since PRLG-functions subsume (generalize) RLG-functions, Theorems 8.3,8.6 and 8.8 imply
Theorem 8.9. Every discounted CLPP and zero-cycle-free LSP instance can be optimized in expected subexponential
time.
For discounted CLPPs, checking attractiveness in line (5) of Algorithm 1, can be done (as explained in
Section 6.3) by using the optimal solution of the LP maxx (1Tx|S()), corresponding to computing the f-value in
the current vertex , which the algorithm may additionally return from line (2). If we want to avoid problems
with non-strongly polynomial LP-algorithms and high precision arithmetic (coefﬁcients for probabilities involved
may be as close to 1 as 1 − 1/2poly(n), where n is the number of game vertices), we can rely on combinato-
rial subexponential LP-algorithms of Kalai [33,34] or Matoušek et al. [39,40]. This will keep the same subex-
ponential upper bound
(
2O(
√
n log n) · 2O(
√
n log n) = 2O(
√
n log n)
)
. As a disadvantage, this makes the cost of just
one switch subexponential rather than (non-strongly) polynomial, and squares the overall (subexponential)
complexity.
Corollary 8.10. Every SSG and MPG can be solved in expected subexponential time.
Note that in the case of LSP and MPGs, after ﬁnding an optimal strategy ∗ on P\F in line (4) the algorithm has
the shortest paths distances from all vertices to the sink (which may be returned from line (2), in addition to 0). Thus
it avoids solving linear programs and is purely combinatorial.
Corollary 8.11. Every MPG can be solved in expected subexponential time 2O
(√
d log(d)
)
, where d is the number
of MAX vertices, and simultaneously (in the case of integral edge weights) pseudopolynomial time O(poly(n) · W),
where n is a total number of vertices and W is the maximal absolute edge weight.
The second bound follows from the fact that the algorithm proceeds by monotonic (proﬁtable) switches, each time
increasing the distances in (31) by integral increments.
Although MPGs are known to be polynomially reducible to SSGs [56] (thus the subexponential algorithm from
Section 8.4 applies), the LSP-based algorithm has a crucial advantage. It does not rely on solving linear programs,
either by non-strongly polynomialmethods (and associated precision and stability issues), or by strongly subexponential
methods (with worse hidden constants and subexponential time per iteration).
Recently Khachiyan, Gurvich, Zhao et al. [55,37,36] demonstrated that LSP instances with nonnegative edgeweights
can be optimized in polynomial time, by an extension of Dijkstra’s algorithm (generalized to nodewise blocking
systems). Note that the reduction from MPGs requires, however, negative weights.
8.5. Subexponential algorithms for parity games
The described randomized subexponential and simultaneously pseudopolynomial algorithm for MPGs
(Corollary 8.10) immediately gives the algorithm for parity games, by a straightforward reduction described in the
end of Section 2.7. A better pseudopolynomial bound is achieved by assigning every edge leaving a vertex of color c
weight (−mc)c, where mc is 1 plus the number of vertices of colors up to c of opposite parity. This gives the pseu-
dopolynomial bound O((n/k + 1)k · poly(n)) in the worst case for a parity game with k colors, which is better than the
subexponential bound when k is small.
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A deterministic subexponential algorithm for parity games of roughly the same (slightly higher) subexponential
complexity nO(
√
n) is suggested in [32]. However, this algorithm has the following drawbacks. (1) It does not generalize
to mean payoff, discounted payoff, and SSGs. (2) It is based on a simple preprocessing in the straightforward algorithm
for parity games. The preprocessing consists in checking whether one of the players has a small winning set (called
a dominion) of size up to √n, in which the winner can keep the adversary forever. This stage already takes time
n(
√
n)
, generating all subsets of size
√
n of the n-element set; thus the algorithm’s best running time is also n(
√
n)
.
Note in addition, that most nontrivial games do not have small dominions of size √n, so this test is wasteful
in most cases. The subexponential bound of the algorithm is based upon the fact that the solution to the recurrence
T (n)=nO(√n)+T (n−1)+T (n−√n) isnO(√n), with the ﬁrst termbeing the cost of (preprocessing at) each iteration. For
comparison, the subexponential analyses of the randomized subexponential algorithms presented in this paper are based
on the more “favorable” recurrence T (n)=nO(1)+T (n−1)+1/n∑ni=1 T (n− i), with a polynomial cost per iteration.
(3) Whereas the best- and worst-case running times of the algorithm [32] are both n(
√
n)
, the randomized algorithm
for mean payoff (hence for parity) games described in this paper in addition to the subexponential 2O(
√
n log n) bound
has the simultaneous pseudopolynomial bound O((n/k + 1)k · poly(n)) (Corollary 8.10 and the preceding paragraph),
which is better than the subexponential one for a small number of colors, typical in practice.
8.6. Subexponential algorithms for D-matrix GLCP
The description of a randomized subexponential algorithm for the D-matrix GLCP, based on combinatorial linear
programming schemes, needs the following modiﬁcations to the previous development. Given a DGLCP instance
(N, q), deﬁne a hyperstructure as a Cartesian productP=∏ni=1 Si , where nk is the number of MAX blocks, k is the
total number of blocks, Si={0, . . . , pi}, andpi the size of the i-th block. Intuitively,P is the space of all MAX strategies,
with 0 ∈ Si corresponding to i ={zi = 0} and j > 0 corresponding to i ={wij = 0}. Deﬁne a substructureP′ ofP as
a Cartesian product P′ =∏ni=1 S′i , where 0 ∈ S′i ⊆ Si for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Such a substructure corresponds to the
set of strategies in a DGLCP instance (N, q), in which some constraints have been deleted (which remains a DGLCP
instance).
Deﬁne the valuation on the hyperstructureP as follows. For every MAX strategy  ∈ P the GLCP(N, q) (obtained
by substituting  considered as an assignment of zeros for zi and wij , as described in Section 7.4) is a ZD+-matrix
GLCP, possessing a unique solution (w, z) (Theorems 7.10, and 7.12). Find this solution as described in Section 8.7.
Assign to  the value () = val(w, z), as deﬁned by (30). With this valuation:
(1) every two neighbors  and ′ on P (at Hamming distance 1) corresponding to an attractive switch from  to ′
have values ()< (′);
(2) on every substructure P′ =∏ni=1 S′i with 0 ∈ S′i ⊆ Si for each i, there is a unique stable (optimal) solution/value
(cf., Theorem 7.16).
Now numerous well-known randomized subexponential schemes [33,34,40] for ﬁnding a (globally) maximal val-
uation (stable strategy solving the DGLCP instance (N, q)) on the structure P apply. One possible version of the
algorithm [51], quite similar to Algorithm 1 from Section 8.4, is as follows.
Randomized algorithm for the D-matrix GLCP. Given a hyperstructureP associated to a DGLCP-instance, consider
the initial strategy = {zi = 0}i=1,...,n, corresponding to the point ˆ= (0, . . . , 0) ∈ P (below, for brevity we identify
points of hyperstructures with corresponding strategies), and proceed as follows.
(1) if ˆ= (ˆ1, . . . , ˆn) and the bottom of recursion is hit, i.e.,24
P=
n∏
i=1
{0} ∪ {ˆi}, (32)
24 Technically, we have to keep 0-components in substructures in (32) in order to be able to associate elements of hyperstructures to strategies
in GLCPs, since, in general, the strategy switch to {zi = 0} is not excluded. However, starting with the strategy ˆ= (0, . . . , 0), and making attractive
switches only, by the Monotonicity Theorem 7.15, every switch away from {zi = 0} is deﬁnitive, since zi for i ∈ MAX can only increase. Therefore,
when (32) holds we immediately know that  is optimal in P, and it remains to solve the GLCP(N, q) to ﬁnd values to be used in determining
further attractive switches.
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then solve an instance of ZD+-matrix GLCP(N, q) by one of the algorithms described in Section
8.7;
(2) otherwise, consider a substructure P′ ⊂ P containing , obtained by (temporarily) deleting a random c ∈ Si ,
c = 0, c = i for a random i25 ;
(3) apply the algorithm recursively to ﬁnd a stable (=optimal) ∗ on P′;
(4) return back the last c temporarily thrown away and check whether ∗ is stable in P;
(5) if yes, return ∗ as stable (=optimal) on P;
(6) if not, make an attractive switch for ∗, replacing ∗i with c; denote the resulting strategy  and repeat from step 1.
The analyses of [33,34,40,51] using Theorems 7.15 and 7.16 yield Theorem 8.12.Monotonicity of attractive switches
(Theorem 7.15) is essential for the acyclicity of the algorithm. Uniqueness (Theorems 7.7 and 7.12) is crucial for the
subexponential analysis, because after ﬁnding an optimum on a substructureP′ and making the next attractive switch,
P′ will never be revisited by the algorithm again (each attractive switch increases the value), and the subexponential
analysis based on hidden dimensions applies; see [33,34,40,51].
Theorem 8.12. The above algorithm solves an instance of a DGLCP with n MAX blocks after expected subexponential
2O(
√
n log n) number of switches and invocations of the subroutine solving ZD+-matrix GLCP(N, q) in step 1.
In Section 8.7 we show that ZD+-matrix GLCP(N, q) can also be solved in expected subexponential time. This
results in the ﬁrst nontrivial subclass of the P-matrix GLCP solvable in expected subexponential time (in the number
of variables).
8.7. Solving one-player Z-GLCPs
In the bottom of recursion (when the full MAX strategy  is ﬁxed) the randomized algorithm described in the previous
section solves GLCP(N, q), an instance of the ZD+-matrix GLCP with a unique solution, as explained in Section 7.5.
There are several possible algorithms for this problem.
(1) By using the least element property [19], solving a feasible Z-matrix GLCP (N, q) amounts to solving a single
linear program, minimizing an arbitrary positive-coordinate linear target function over the feasible domain {z :
z0, q + Nz0}. There is a multitude of polynomial (but non-strongly) algorithms for that.
(2) The above linear programming problem instance can be solved in randomized strongly subexponential time by
the algorithms [33,34,40]. Note that these algorithms are subexponential 2O
(√
(k−n) log(k−n)
)
in the number k − n
of MIN blocks (equals the number of z-variables remaining in GLCP(N, q)).
The advantage of using options 1 or 2 depends on the size of coefﬁcients in the instance GLCP(N, q). Applying
option 2, together with Theorem 8.12 results in the following
Theorem 8.13. A D-matrix GLCP with k blocks, n of which belong to MAX, can be solved in expected subexponential
time 2O
(√
n log n+√(k−n) log(k−n))
.
The existence of a strongly polynomial algorithm for solving the ZD+-matrix GLCP, which correspond to one-player
stopping stochastic games (or Markov decision processes), is currently an open problem; see [1,2] for a recent progress
(strongly polynomial algorithms for one-player DPGs). With a strongly polynomial algorithm for ZD+-matrix GLCPs,
the bound in Theorem 8.13 would reduce to 2O(
√
n log n)
. The whole algorithm may be “dualized”, making attractive
switches in the MIN blocks (which is an advantage, when the number of MIN blocks is smaller than of MAX blocks).
This would result in the bound 2O(
√
m logm)
, where m = min(n, k − n).
25 In other words, we delete a random facet of P not containing .
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Subexponential algorithms for the LCPs resulting from MPGs and LCPs (see Section 5) are analogous to the GLCP
algorithms, and we refer the reader to [11] for the details.
9. Conclusions
Further insights are needed in order to capture more combinatorial structure of games and to exploit it in more
sophisticated, advanced, and efﬁcient combinatorial optimization algorithms. Investigating semideﬁnite relaxations
and lift-and-project methods seem very promising.
One of the most important long-standing fundamental open problems in combinatorial and mathematical optimiza-
tion is the existence of a strongly polynomial algorithm for the linear programming problem. On the other hand, there
are strongly subexponential randomized algorithms for linear programming [33,40,34], which have better worst-case
bounds compared with non-strongly polynomial ones when coefﬁcients of a linear system are large. The miniatuar-
ized, simpler, and well-structured particular case of the problem arises in games, namely solving ZD+-matrix GLCPs
(cf., Theorem 7.12 and Section 8.7), or, equivalently, one-player SSGs. Currently, there are no known strongly polyno-
mial algorithm for this polynomially solvable problem. Obtaining one such algorithm is a challenge. Such an algorithm
may give new insights for the potential extensions to two-player MPGs, DPGs, and SSGs. For comparison, there are
nontrivial strongly polynomial algorithms for solving one-player DPGs (particular case of SSGs) based on strongly
polynomial algorithms for restricted classes of linear programs [14,29,1,2]. Note that our LSP-based subexponential
algorithm forMPGs [13,12] eliminated the need for using a non-strongly polynomial subroutine for linear programming
one would need if reducing MPGs to SSGs.
Themajor open problems concerningMPGs are the existence ofweakly, O(poly(n)·log W), and strongly polynomial
time algorithms, or, in the long-standing absence thereof, some evidence (lower bounds) showing the inherent hardness
of the problem.
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